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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I show that ECOWAS and the international community, in a bid to 
secure an end to Liberia’s intractable civil war, acceded to a power sharing arrangement 
among the warlords. This arrangement, which granted the warlords political legitimacy 
and considerable influence and control over the transition process, led to the 
unsustainable warlord peace of 1997. The preoccupation of the warlord dominated 
Council, ECOWAS, and the international community with the 1997 elections as a means 
of resolving the conflict resulted in the failure to restructure the security forces before the 
inauguration of the post-election government as stipulated by the Abuja Agreement. The 
failure to restructure the security forces offered the post-war Taylor government the 
opportunity to carry out a bogus exercise inconsistent with the Abuja Agreement, which 
he readily seized. The exercise resulted in the selective demobilization and gradual 
marginalization of the Krahn dominated Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), and the creation 
of several new armed units dominated by former National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) militias. These and the ruthlessness with which they operated escalated fears of 
vulnerabilities of former adversaries and this contributed significantly to the resumption 
of war in 1999. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Motivated by the general question of what determines the sustainability of post-
war peace or what influences the return to war against the background of the phenomenal 
rise in the instability of negotiated settlement experienced in the nineties (Liberia 
inclusive), this thesis identifies effective implementation of a peace agreement in general, 
and the elements that addresses the security concerns of parties to a conflict in particular, 
as critical to the sustainability of post-war peace. It argues that a causal relationship exists 
between the flawed implementation of the Abuja II Accord of August 1996 and Liberia’s 
return to war in 1999. 
Chapter I, “Introduction,” covers the purpose, importance, literature review and 
the argument of this thesis. It commences with an analytical review of the theoretical 
literature on the implementation of peace agreements, identifying factors that influence 
the implementation of agreements and highlighting the crucial role of agreement 
implementation in sustaining negotiated settlements. 
Chapter II, “The Failure of Peace Enforcement,” sets the stage for the argument of 
this thesis, which is that ECOWAS' shift from a strategy of military peace enforcement to 
one of appeasement resulted in warlord peace, which was the primary cause of Liberia's 
return to war in 1999. It examines ECOWAS’s peace enforcement strategy from 1990-
1993, and the factors that contributed to its abandonment in favor of appeasement. It 
discusses the international and regional diplomatic and political contexts of the 
intervention and then argues that ECOMOG’s peace enforcement effort was undermined 
and eventually failed primarily because of the lack of political and diplomatic support 
rather than military failures on the ground.  
 Chapter III, “Negotiating Warlord Peace,” traces the process by which ECOWAS 
and the international community legitimated the warlords as political leaders following 
the failure to enforce peace. It shows that the strategy faltered because ECOWAS lost 
leverage over the warlords, and settled for a warlord peace with the 1996 Abuja II 
Accord. It further argues that Abuja II might still have led to a lasting peace had it been 
 xii
fully implemented. Regrettably, it was not and this set the incentive structure that led the 
postwar government to renege on the agreement and start down the path back to war.  
 Chapter IV, “The Flawed Restructuring of the Security Forces and the 
Resumption of War,” traces the process by which Liberian President Charles Taylor’s 
flawed and partisan restructuring and use of the security forces against former adversaries 
led to the return to war in 1999. It shows how Taylor’s rejection of his commitment to 
restructuring of the security forces under according to Abuja II and the forced exit of 
ECOMOG from Liberia exacerbated fears of vulnerability of former adversaries and 
political opponents, leading them to chose war over domination by Taylor.  
 Finally, Chapter V concludes this thesis by offering some final thoughts on the 
critical causal relationship between the effective implementation of a peace agreement 
and the sustainability of post-war peace. It crystallizes some general findings in the 
theoretical arguments to the end state of the Abuja II, and applies the lessons of this 




What determines whether peace lasts or war resumes?1 What element of 
negotiated settlement is likely to promote settlement stability or influence the return to 
war? The phenomenon of return to war in negotiated settlements underscores the 
relevance of these questions. The experience of short-lived post-conflict peace and 
stability was characteristic of civil wars that were hastily resolved by the international 
community in the mid nineties and to the present, in the rush for quick and cheap peace. 
Somalia, Angola (twice), Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire 
provides good examples. Evidence shows that the stability of negotiated settlements is 
often related to the failure to implement agreements, particularly provisions of 
agreements that address the security concerns of parties to conflict.2 The requirement for 
comprehensive implementation of security provisions of a peace agreement remains 
crucial because the mistrust and fears of vulnerabilities that characterize negotiated 
settlements have the potential of undermining post-conflict stability. This is important 
because no meaningful or lasting post-conflict stability and reconstruction effort can take 
place in the absence of sustainable post-war peace and stability. 
Liberia experienced the tragedy of relapsing into war two years after the end of 
the first civil war at the cost of not only further loss of human lives, but also the 
termination of the international effort at reconstruction of post-war Liberia coordinated 
by the UN Mission of Liberia (UNOL).3 In the words of one analyst: “The tragedy of 
Liberia today is the return to civil war after a devastating period of armed conflict from 
1989 to 1996 that cost an estimated 200,000 lives. Since the mid-2000s, tens of thousands  
 
                                                 
1 Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreement and the Durability of Peace (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 1. 
2 Caroline A. Hartzell, “Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlement to Intrastate Wars,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 43, no.1 (Feb 1999): 6. 
3“UN History in Liberia from1989-1997 and 1997-2003.” 
http://www.unmil.org/content.asp?cat=history accessed on 24 July 2005.  
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of additional combat-related fatalities are believed to have occurred.”4 Why did Liberia 
relapse into war? Was there a causal relationship between the resolution of the first 
conflict and the resumption of the second? 
On December 24, 1989, the Charles Taylor led National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) invaded Liberia from neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, with the goal of removing the 
government of President Samuel Kanyon Doe. Following the escalation of the conflict, 
and in the absence of credible international response, the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) intervened with the intention of implementing a peace plan 
that had been crafted by the Liberian Inter Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC).5 
ECOWAS deployed the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) with a 
mandate to “keep peace, restore law and order and contain the spread of the conflict to 
neighboring states and to help Liberians establish an interim government until elections 
could be held.”6 EOWAS initially pursued political option aimed at facilitating a political 
solution to the crisis based on the IFMC peace plan, but later adopted military option.7 
Over time the conflict degenerated into a contest for power, territory and exploitation of 
lootable natural resources, which saw the emergence of new factional groups. This 
development further escalated the conflict and complicated its resolution. The conflict 
persisted and defied efforts at resolution as the warring groups broke one cease–fire 
agreement after another. However, after six years, ECOWAS, with support from the 
international community, ended the war with the Abuja II Accord of August 1996. 
Regrettably, this resolution was short-lived.  The second Liberian civil war began in 
1999.  
In spite of the central role of the 1996 Abuja II Accord in the resolution of 
Liberia’s first civil war, no significant attention has been given to its effects on Liberia’s 
                                                 
4 Nicholas Cook, “Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and U.S. Relations,” CRS 
Report for Congress, December 31, 2003, 1.  
5 IFMC was a coalition of civil society organizations  involved in the mediation of the Liberian 
conflict preceding  ECOWAS intervention.   
6 Cook, 1; Ikechi Mgbeobi, Collective Insecurity: The Liberian Crisis, Unilateralism and Global 
Order (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2003), 59.  
7 Clement Adibe, “The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership,” Third World Quarterly 
18, no. 3 (1997): 471; Max Ahmadu Sesay, “Politics and Society in Post-war Liberia,” Journal of Modern 
African Studies 34, no. 3 (Sep. 1996): 396. 
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return to war in 1999. The literature on Liberia’s first civil war dwells largely on the 
weaknesses of ECOMOG’s military operation.8 While the focus on ECOMOG failures is 
not altogether out of place, especially for the lessons it offers military aspects of conflict 
resolution, the lack of attention to the diplomatic aspect of the peace process in general, 
and Abuja II in particular, leaves a significant gap in our understanding of the return to 
war in Liberia. No systematic study of a possible causal relationship between the flawed 
implementation of the 1996 Abuja II Accord, the security situation in post-conflict 
Liberia from 1997 to 1999, and the resumption of war exists. Such a study is important 
for the lessons it may hold for current stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Liberia as 
well as similar efforts to contain intractable conflicts elsewhere. 
This thesis shows how the failure to implement the security provision on the 
restructuring of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and other security forces as contained 
in the Abuja II Accord of August 1996 undermined post-conflict security in Liberia 
between 1997 and 1999 and contributed significantly to the resumption of the civil war in 
1999. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Until recently, the literature on ending civil wars through negotiated settlements 
focused largely on the signing of a peace agreement.9 However, the recognition of cycles 
of conflict – agreement - conflict has led to an increased focus on the implementation of 
peace agreements; that is, getting parties to a conflict to honor commitments made in the 
agreements. The literature on the implementation of peace agreements suggests that the 
sustainability of peace is affected by many factors, including fear and uncertainty after 
the signing of a peace agreement, the roles of third party guarantors (international, 
regional organizations, and other governments), the leadership of the formerly warring 
parties, the availability of “lootable” resources, the nature of the peace agreement and the 
                                                 
8 See for example, Hebert Howe, “Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Peacekeeping,” International 
Security 21 no. 3 (1996-1997): 146. 
9 Stephen John Stedman, “Introduction,” in Ending Civil Wars: Implementation of Peace Agreements, 
eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothschild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002): 1. 
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conflict cycle or “ripeness” of the conflict, as well the international community’s 
preferred option of power-sharing arrangements as a mechanism of conflict resolution in 
“minor” states at the end of  the Cold War.10  
Scholars agree that the period immediately after the signing of a peace agreement 
is fraught with risks, uncertainty, and vulnerability. Stedman argues that this period 
constitutes the greatest uncertainty in a peace process. Failure to get warring parties to 
live up to peace agreements has often restarted wars. He therefore stresses the need for 
comprehensive implementation of peace agreements in negotiated settlements.11 
Implementation of an agreement serves to allay fears and vulnerabilities and offers the 
requisite foundation on which sustainable peace and security rests. Rothschild also 
emphasizes the dangers of relying on the signing of peace agreements without ensuring 
that parties live up to their commitments. Such a gap, he argues, can create room for 
manipulation or reneging that can heighten fears and tensions and undermine both the 
peace process and post-conflict stability. “The mistrust and animosity surrounding 
military encounters are carried over into post-war relations. Viewing their adversaries in 
‘zero-sum’ terms, leaders of various political groups are extremely uncertain about the  
 
                                                 
10 Donald Rothchild, “Settlement Terms and Post Conflict Stability,” in Ending Civil Wars: 
Implementation of Peace Agreements, eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothschild, and Elizabeth 
Cousens (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 117; Hartzell, 6; Mary H. Moran and M. Anne 
Pitcher, “The ‘basket case’ and the ‘poster child’: explaining the end of civil wars in Liberia and 
Mozambique,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2004): 502; Paul Collier, “Economic Causes of Civil 
Conflict and their Implications for Policy,” in Turbulent Peace, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 
Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 144; Fen Osler 
Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlement Succeed or Fail (Washington: D.C., U.S. Institute of 
Peace, 1996), 210; Dennis Tull and Andreas Mehler, “The Hidden Cost of Power- Sharing: Reproducing 
Insurgent Violence in Africa,” African Affairs, 104/416, (2003), 375-398; Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical 
Barrier to Civil war Settlement,” International Organization 51, no. 3 (1997): 340; Stephen Stedman and 
Donald Rothchild, “Peace Operations: From Short Term to Long Term Commitment,” International 
Peacekeeping 3, no. 2 (Summer): 17-35; William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution, Conflict and Intervention 
in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 227; Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, “War to Peace: 
Dilemmas of Multilateral Intervention in Civil Wars,” African Security Review, 9, no 3 (2000):1-16; 
Matthew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, “Civil War Settlement and Implementation of Military Power 
Sharing Arrangements,” Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 3 (2003): 316; and Dorina A Bekoe, “Towards 
a Theory of Peace Agreement Implementation: The Case of Liberia,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 
38, 2-3 (2003): 256-94. 
11 Stephen John Stedman, “Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil War: Lessons and 
Recommendations for policy Makers,” International Peace Academy Policy Series Paper on Peace 
Implementation (New York: May, 2001), 1.   
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transition to peace, fearing that it will result in their vulnerability and possible elimination 
— either as a political force or as a physical entity.”12 Implementation of an agreement 
allays these fears by building confidence and signaling commitment to the agreement. 
Chester Crocker argues that “[p]eople assume incorrectly that after negotiated settlement 
things naturally wind down, without effective implementation of a peace agreement, what 
you get is a political ‘mess’ and untold human suffering.”13 Hartzell makes a similar 
argument, with particular reference to implementing the security provisions of an 
agreement. She argues that full implementation increases the incentives of parties to a 
conflict to stay on course with the peace process and enhances the prospect of post-
conflict stability. This is likely to be so because it addresses the security concerns and 
fears of parties to a conflict, and provides institutional guarantees of their safety.14  
 Behind this consensus on the importance of complete implementation of peace 
agreements to lasting peace are debates about the conditions under which fears and 
uncertainty are most likely to be allayed and peace agreements fully implemented. The 
first debate revolves around whether agreements crafted and implemented by the parties 
themselves or by third party interveners are more likely to be fully and successfully 
implemented.  Walter argues that “a third-party guarantor can change the level of fear 
and insecurity that accompanies treaty implementation and thus facilitate settlement, third 
parties can guarantee that groups will be protected, terms will be fulfilled and promises 
kept (or at least can ensure that groups can survive until new government and a new 
national military is formed).”15 Third-party guarantors are seen as crucial in the 
monitoring and implementation of sensitive provisions of an agreement such as 
disarming and demobilizing warring factions, and establishing national security forces.16 
Stedman and Rothchild also stress the importance of third parties in a number of inter-
                                                 
12 Donald Rothchild, “Assessing Africa’s Two-Phrase Peace Implementation Process: Power Sharing 
and Democratization,” unpublished paper, n.d.; Rothchild, “Settlement Terms and Post -Conflict 
Stability,”117.  
13 Quoted in “Why Peace Agreement Fail or Succeed: Effective Implementation is Crucial to the 
Success of a Negotiated Peace Settlement Process,” USIP Peace Watch Online, December 1996 
www.usip.org/peacewatch/1996/1296/peace.html accessed on 16 December 2005. 
14 Hartzell, 6. 
15 Walter, 340. 
16 Ibid. 
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related military/security aspects of a peace agreement implementation, including 
overseeing the integration of a new army, allaying the fears of parties to the conflict and 
extracting their commitment to the agreement.17    
Others, including Hoddie and Hartzell, suggest that third party guarantors may not 
increase the likelihood of successful implementation.  They note that third-party 
enforcement has not consistently contributed to effective peace implementation, while 
agreements have often been implemented and peace endured in the absence of third-party 
enforcement.  
[O]ur concern with this policy prescription (third party) is that it has the 
potential to mask the intentions behind the actions of parties to the 
agreement. In other words, the presence of third parties forces acting as 
agreement enforcers will often mean that parties to the settlement will not 
have the opportunity to assess whether behavior consistent with the signed 
agreement is based on genuine desire for peace or simply expedient 
behavior intended to placate the interested third parties. Because actions 
with the potential to serve as signals of conciliatory behavior are likely to 
be discounted if they are perceived as reaction to the demands of a third-
party enforcer, the establishing of trust among former combatants becomes 
less probable and peace may prove less durable once external parties 
leaves the scene.18  
Thus they suggest that peace is more likely to be sustainable when the leadership of 
warring parties reach an peace agreement and participate in its implementation without 
third party pressure, since “implementation serves as a concrete commitment to peace as 
signatories to an agreement prove willing to endure the cost associated with both 
compromising their original war aims and withstanding potential challenges from within 
their own group.”19 Warring parties’ willingness to endure these costs voluntarily is seen 
as providing a better guarantee of the process than third-party interventions. Bekoe adds 
that parties are likely to be more committed to the implementation of agreements when 
the level of vulnerability of the contending parties — economic, political and military — 
is balanced.20 
                                                 
17 Stedman and Rothchild, 18. 
18 Hoddie and Hartzell, 316. 
19 Ibid., 319. 
20 Bekoe, 256. 
 7
Evidence shows that over time parties have a growing incentive and tendency to 
renege on commitments in order to maintain a stronger position in the post-war 
government. Post-war governments thus cannot be fully trusted to honor commitments to 
implement crucial provisions of agreements after the transition to post-war governance. 
However, third-party commitment to full implementation of peace agreements is also 
limited and constrained. Among the most serious of these limitations are regional and 
international political dynamics, including the extent of regional and international 
consensus and support for implementation and the activities and roles of regional and 
international collaborators and spoilers, and inadequate logistical, financial, and 
specialized peacekeeping capacities to pursue comprehensive implementation. All of 
these limitations are likely to be more severe when the third party is a regional 
organization rather than the United Nations or a major power.21 Closely related is Moran 
and Pitcher’s argument that the resolution or continuation of conflict is dependent upon 
the calculations by the leadership of warring parties about the cost, chances, and time 
they require to achieve military victory.22 Similar calculations go into decisions about 
cooperation and compromise in the process of implementing peace agreements. To alter 
the calculation of warring parties’ leadership and induce a compromise in a peace 
process, therefore, third-party interveners must have the necessary resources and 
capabilities — economic, military and political. Walter argues that third-party 
interventions are more likely to endure the political and financial cost that comprehensive 
implementation of peace agreement entails if they have a stake in the country of conflict -
- economic investments, strategic interests or colonial ties, for example. These, she 
argues, provide the incentive, commitment, and political will required to persevere 
through the challenges and costs associated with comprehensive implementation of peace 
agreement. Finally, a third party must have sufficient military capability to effectively 
deter cheating and intransigence and also be willing to use force if necessary.23  
 
                                                 
21 Hampson, 210.  
22 Moran and Pitcher, 502.  
23 Walter, 340.  
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Others point to characteristics of the conflict itself as an important determinant of 
the how difficult peace negotiation and implementation are likely to be.  For instance, 
conflicts motivated by “greed,” commonly known as resource insurgencies, are largely 
sustained by the exploitation of “lootable” resources and are therefore believed to be less 
amenable to the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements. Collier argues that 
as long as belligerents maintain control over territories with “lootable” resources and are 
able to profit from the exploitation of these resources, they will have less incentive and 
motivation to commit to an agreement.24 Similarly, Rothchild argues that such predatory 
behavior will continue to constitute an impediment to the implementation of a peace 
agreement, until it is effectively dealt with.25 A peace process must therefore take into 
consideration the economic incentives that motivate and sustain conflict, and ensure they 
are addressed both in the negotiation and implementation of a peace agreement. 
Zartman argues it is more difficult to negotiate and implement peace agreements 
when a conflict has not yet reached a mutually hurting stalemate.26 When belligerents are 
pressured by third parties to reach a ceasefire or sign peace agreements before they have 
exhausted the will, resources, capability and external support to continue the conflict, 
their commitment to peace is likely to be thin indeed. This leaves external powers with 
the choice of allowing the conflict to run its course (risking massive human suffering), or 
promoting a negotiated settlement under less than ideal conditions. The latter option has 
been far more common since the end of the Cold War. Settlements signed under external 
pressure often involve costly concessions, may include more than can reasonably be 
accomplished, and may deliberately leave some difficult issues unaddressed or obscured 
in the interests of expediency. These unresolved issues and concessions often become 
problematic in the implementation process, and/or impact negatively on the end-state of 
the peace process, as warring parties are likely to interpret such ambiguities in ways that 
benefit themselves during implementation. More often than not agreements brokered  
 
                                                 
24 Collier, 144.  
25 Donald Rothchild, “Implementation and its Effects on Building and Sustaining Peace: The Effect of 
Changing Structures of Incentives,” unpublished paper, University of California, Davis (2000): 2.  
26 Zartman, 227. 
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under these conditions constitute a recipe for disaster. Thus, Hampson concludes that 
peace agreements sometimes contain the seeds of their own destruction.27  
Other analysts suggest that the international community’s preference for power 
sharing among the parties to the conflict, which has been seen as the most expedient 
means of resolving post-Cold War African conflicts, ultimately undermines sustainable 
post conflict security and stability in the long run. Tull and Mehler argue that giving 
“rebels’ a share of state power creates incentive structures which turn the rebel path into 
an appealing option in the pursuit of otherwise blocked political aspirations.”28 The 
institutionalization of this practice provides political pay-offs for insurgent violence and 
complicates the resolution of conflict. In addition, these incentives lead to intransigence 
on the part of warring parties, which are likely to cooperate in a peace process and 
comply with an agreement only when they are sure of emerging with a significant share 
of power at the end of the peace processes. A power sharing strategy, Aning argues, has 
inherent dilemmas, contradictions and challenges that can lead either to transition from 
war to peace or regression back to war in the long term. All that is certain, he concludes, 
is the transition from overt war to a “condition of temporary non-belligerence.”29 
Despite this extensive analysis of the crucial role of implementation of a peace 
agreement in the stability of negotiated settlement in the theoretical literature, studies of 
Liberia’s first civil war are largely devoted to assessments of ECOMOG military 
capabilities. For instance, Howe concludes that ECOMOG failed to demonstrate that 
regional organizations can be viable tools in conflict resolution.30 Magyar follows a 
similar line of reasoning, his attempt to establish the lessons of Liberia were based solely 
on an appraisal of ECOMOG. He assigns primary responsibility for the fragility of the 
post-war peace to poor planning and execution of the ECOMOG peacekeeping mission.31 
Like Howe, he fails to explore the crucial influence of the nature and the implementation 
                                                 
27 Hampson, 3. 
28 Tull and Mehler, 376.  
29 Aning, 1.  
30 Howe, 146. 
31 Magyar , 179. 
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of the peace agreement that ended the war. Although Adebayo looks beyond ECOWAS’ 
military operations and does identify weakness in the peace deal that ended the war, 
which he rightly terms “warlord peace,” he does not explore sufficiently the critical role 
of the implementation of Abuja in Liberia’s return to war in 1999.32 This constitutes a 
significant gap in the literature, which this thesis attempts to fill. 
B. THESIS ARGUMENT  
After six futile years of trying to end the Liberian civil war and create a lasting 
peace, ECOWAS and the international community legitimated the warlords as political 
leaders, handing the ownership of the transitional government to them through the Abuja 
II Accord of August 1996. The warlords were also entrusted with the responsibility to 
implement the peace agreement, including the provision regarding the restructuring of the 
AFL and other security forces. This marked a significant departure from the previous 
strategy, which had sought to defeat them militarily and deny them significant political 
influence and power in the transitional and post-war political arrangement. The 
agreement was generally perceived as an appeasement strategy to elicit the cooperation 
and compliance of the warlords in order to end the fighting. The transition process ended 
with the election of Charles Taylor as president, and without the restructuring of the 
security forces, in 1997. The failure to restructure the security forces afforded the post-
war government of Charles Taylor unrestrained control and influence to block further 
implementation of the agreement. 
Building on the scholarly consensus that comprehensive implementation of a 
peace agreement is crucial to sustainable post-conflict peace and stability, this thesis 
argues that the seriously flawed implementation of the security provisions on the 
restructuring of the AFL and other security forces ultimately contributed significantly to 
the resumption of war in 1999. This flawed implementation resulted from the power 
sharing arrangement, which was focused on elections as a way of peacefully resolving the 
conflict but resulted in the warlord peace of 1997 to 1999, which in turn facilitated the 
                                                 
32 Adebayo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, 58; Adekeye 
Adebayo, “Liberia: A War Lord’s Peace,” 622.  
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rejection of commitments in the agreement by the post-election government. Instead of 
establishing ethnically balanced armed forces as stipulated in Abuja II, President Taylor 
carried out a selective demobilization exercise, which gradually marginalized the 
Krahn/Mandingo dominated AFL.  Other state security forces were packed with his 
NPFL fighters, and new armed units were created to strengthen his position vis-à-vis 
“former” adversaries and political opponents, most of who went into exile. These actions 
escalated fears of vulnerabilities and significantly undermined the fragile post-war 
security situation.  
The flawed implementation and resumption of war in 1999 therefore affirm the 
need for effective third party enforcement (with regional and international support). 
Effective third party implementation was more likely to have constrained and reassured 
stronger and weaker parties respectively and forestalled the manipulations and escalation 
of fears of vulnerabilities in post-war Liberia that culminated in the resumption of war in 
1999. The international community’s search for quick and cheap peace at the expense of 
the comprehensive implementation of the peace agreement was not only a recipe for 
disaster for Liberia; it was also not cost effective in the long run.  ECOWAS and the UN 
would be called upon to return to Liberia in 2003, for a much more costly second effort to 
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II. THE FAILURE OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis argues that ECOWAS' shift from the largely Nigerian driven military 
and political strategy, which sought to defeat and deny the warlords political power, to 
the appeasement strategy resulted in the warlord peace, which held for only two years 
and was the primary cause of Liberia's return to war in 1999. This chapter sets the stage 
for that argument by examining the peace enforcement strategy of 1990-1993, and the 
factors that contributed to its abandonment in favor of appeasement. It begins by 
describing the international and regional diplomatic and political contexts, and then 
argues that ECOMOG’s peace enforcement effort was undermined primarily by the lack 
of political and diplomatic support rather than military failures on the ground.  A political 
solution that excluded the warlords depended upon peace enforcement in Liberia.  This 
chapter seeks to show that such a solution could have succeeded with more regional and 
international support, which would have prevented the second round of the Liberian civil 
war and the second international peacekeeping/post-conflict security building mission. 
B. PEACE ENFORCEMENT AND POLITICAL EXCLUSION OF THE 
WARLORDS (1990-1993) 
At the extraordinary meeting of the authority of ECOWAS heads of state and 
government at the Bamako-Mali Summit in November 1990, the ECOWAS Peace Plan 
was ratified.33 The plan proposed the establishment of a civil society led Interim 
Government of National Unity (IGNU) composed of the representatives of all armed 
groups, political parties and leaders of civil society and the holding of general elections 
within twelve months. It also tasked ECOMOG to provide peacekeeping support for its 
implementation and stipulated that the leadership of the IGNU was to be ineligible in the 
                                                 
33 The plan which was drafted earlier by the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) in 
Banjul-Gambia in August 1990 was largely an adoption of the peace plan earlier proposed by the IFMC. 
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general elections.34 This showed a determination at the early stages of the intervention to 
deny the leadership of the warring parties’ significant political influence in the transition 
process. As events unfolded the need for the application of coercive measures to compel 
the warlords to comply with a peace plan became clear.35 Consequently ECOWAS, 
pushed by Nigeria, undertook two major operations to enforce peace in 1990 and 1993 
respectively. The attempt to enforce peace and alienate the leadership of the warring 
parties, particularly Charles Taylor, did not enjoy regional or international support. This 
limited the effectiveness of the strategy and contributed significantly to its ultimate 
failure.  
1. The International Community: Initial Apathy and Limited Support 
There was no credible international response to the Liberian crisis prior to 
ECOWAS' intervention. Most observers suggest that the reluctance of the international 
community to get involved in the Liberian conflict was associated with Africa’s reduced 
strategic significance following the end of the Cold War. As Tanner notes, “Liberia did 
not offer the same geo-strategic benefits as it did during the Cold War to justify the 
disbursement of material, political and moral cost of intervention and counter insurgency 
by the international community.”36  
The initial Organization of African Unity (OAU, now African Union) response 
was limited to calls for the international community to intervene and tepid diplomatic 
support for ECOWAS initiatives. Given the prevailing regional and continental political 
dynamics and the poor finances that bedeviled the OAU, its initial limited response was 
                                                 
34 Articls 1.2.d and 1.3 and decisionA/DEC.2/8/90. Text in Official Journal of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS's), November 1992;Comfort Ero, “ECOWAS and Sub 
Regional Peacekeeping in West Africa,” Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, available at 
http://www.jha.ac?article/a005.htm accessed on 16 January 2006. 
35 Although the Peace Plan sought to accommodate all parties to the conflict, the caveat that warring 
parties would be ineligible in prospective elections set Charles Taylor-the chief protagonist to the conflict 
on collision course with ECOWAS in the implementation of the Peace plan.  Taylor rejected the Peace Plan 
and insisted on the presidency by virtue of his control of over 90 percent of Liberia’s territory. He 
consistently refused to recognize the interim government that was later set up and intensified military 
attacks on ECOMOG and Monrovia in an attempt to seize power by force. In this situation the Peace Plan 
only stood a chance if ECOWAS enforced compliance. Having identified Taylor as the obstacle to the 
peace plan, ECOWAS and Nigeria in particular attempted to defeat him.  
36 Victor Tanner, “Railroading Peace,” Review of African Political Economy 25, 75 (1998):145. 
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not surprising. The OAU would appoint Reverend Canaan Banana, former Zimbabwean 
president, as its eminent person to the ongoing Liberian mediation effort in January 1993, 
but it was never seriously involved in the Liberia crisis. 
The UN mustered the political will to respond meaningfully only three years after 
the outbreak of the Liberian conflict, and more than two and the half years into the 
ECOWAS intervention. The United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) first formal 
statement on the civil war was issued on 22 January 1991, more than one year after the 
outbreak of the conflict and five months after the deployment of ECOMOG. It 
commended the efforts of the ECOWAS heads of State, and called upon the parties to the 
conflict to respect the ceasefire agreement.37 On 7 May 1992 the UNSC again 
commended ECOWAS and indicated that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, which it had 
negotiated, offered the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in 
Liberia.38  
The first significant material support for ECOMOG came on 19 November 1992, 
when the UNSC Council responded positively to ECOWAS' request for a UN arms 
embargo on Liberia’s warring factions. The Security Council, through resolution 788 
(1992), imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and 
military equipment to Liberia -- except for those destined for the sole use of the 
peacekeeping forces of ECOWAS.39 The following day, in response to ECOWAS' 
request for the UN to play a greater role in the peace process, the UN Secretary General 
(UNSG) appointed Trevor Livingston Gordon-Somers as his Special Representative for 
Liberia.40 Following the failure of ECOWAS’ second attempt to enforce peace, the UN 
established the United Nations Military Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), 
pursuant to the Cotonou Peace Agreement of 25 July 1993.41 UNOMIL was composed of 
386 observers. Its task was to support ECOMOG in implementing the Cotonou Peace 
                                                 
37 “Liberia-UNOMIL Background,” available at http//www.un.org accessed on 16 December 2005. 
38 Ibid. 
39 “Liberia-UNOMIL Background.”  
40 Ibid. 
41 UNOMIL was the first United Nations peacekeeping mission undertaken in cooperation with a 
peacekeeping operation already established by another organization. 
 16
Agreement, especially the compliance of all parties with the agreement. The UN 
involvement in the Liberian crisis signaled the beginning of the strategic shift from peace 
enforcement to appeasement of the warlords. The UN involvement, which promoted 
mediation and political accommodation and opportunity for the warlords to pursue their 
goals through other means, was expected to enhance the credibility of ECOMOG.42 
But this expectation was not fully realized as the effectiveness of the UN-
ECOWAS partnership was significantly undermined by mutual mistrust and rivalry. 
ECOMOG saw UN involvement, and particularly its monitoring mandate, as an 
indication of distrust of its abilities and intentions on the one hand, and as a placation of 
Taylor on the other.43 As result, resentment among troops and commanders hampered 
smooth relations. ECOMOG resentment was particularly acute in the case of Nigerian 
forces, who had invested substantial human and material resources in the resolution of the 
conflict, believed themselves better experienced than the UN to handle the conflict, and 
perceived the UN as incapable of dealing with the belligerents. Issues of command and 
control and strategy generated tension among UNOMIL and ECOMOG force 
commanders. For instance, UN force commander General Opande’s belief that Taylor 
should be given the benefit of the doubt on his commitment to disarm unilaterally was 
dismissed as naïve by ECOMOG’s force commander General John Inienger. The 
contentious relationship was further exacerbated by the UNOMIL’s direct dealings with 
the NPFL without the participation of ECOMOG. Another area of friction that 
characterized the UNOMIL/ECOMOG partnership was the “trust the UN” public 
information campaign undertaken by the UN. This was interpreted by ECOMOG as 
implicit criticism of its credibility with the population.44 Although ECOMOG bristled at 
the belated UN involvement in Liberia, its own failure to end the war after nearly three 
years on the ground contributed to the involvement of the UN and the recourse to 
political accommodation of the warlords.  
 
                                                 
42 Milkah, 125. 
43 Tuck, 9. 
44 “Liberia: Problematic Peacekeeping,” Africa Confidential (4 March 1994): 23. 
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The historical relationship between the U.S. and Liberia seemed to count for little 
with the Cold War over.  Convinced that it no longer had any important interests in 
Liberia, the U.S. evacuated its citizens at the onset of the war, and limited its involvement 
to humanitarian and diplomatic support thereafter. Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy 
Secretary of State in the Bush Administration, confirmed in June 1990 that the U.S. 
would not be playing a lead role in the Liberian crisis, and endorsed the ECOWAS Peace 
Plan the following month. U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria Lannon Walker reaffirmed to 
General Abacha, Nigeria's Army Chief, that a solution to the crisis would have to come 
from the region.45 Having encouraged ECOWAS to intervene, the U.S. did nothing to 
enhance ECOWAS’ capacity to enforce peace. While the U.S. approved of the 
intervention, it apparently did not approve of the specific solution pursued by ECOWAS 
from 1990 to 1993. Washington provided meaningful support only after the shift in 
strategy from peace enforcement to appeasement. Like the UN, the U.S. preferred a 
political solution that embraced rather than excluding the parties to the conflict. George 
Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa in the Clinton Administration, stated in 
June 1993: “we do not believe a military solution is possible or desirable, but we realize 
that continuing pressure is an inescapable part of the equation for peace in Liberia.”46  
The U.S. also objected to what it perceived as ECOMOG's partisanship. As result, 
in the early stage of the intervention the U.S. chose not to render support to enhance 
ECOMOG capacity to enforce peace, and refused to recognize the Amos Sawyer led 
IGNU, which it regarded as a Nigerian puppet and instrument of ECOMOG.47 The U.S. 
did provide funding and logistical assistance to peacekeeping efforts during the early 
stage, but the support was clearly designed to reduce Nigeria’s influence. Washington 
                                                 
45 Adebayo, Liberia’s Civil War, 57. 
46 Quoted in West Africa, no 3952 (21-27 June 1993): 1054. 
47 While ECOMOG’s partisan relationship with anti Taylor rival factions was definitely a factor in the 
failure of the U.S. to provide decisive logistical and political support to ECOMOG in the early years of the 
intervention, the failure to separate her interaction with Nigeria on the Liberian conflict from her opposition 
to the domestic policies of the then Nigerian military government was no doubt a crucial influence in the 
decision to deny the Nigerian dominated ECOMOG such crucial support. However, there was no doubt that 
the U.S. was in the uncomfortable but understandable position of not wanting to be seen to be supporting 
ECOMOG while opposing the military government in Nigeria, especially after the June 12 election results 
were cancelled. 
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providing $15 million for military equipment to Senegal, and wrote off $45 million of its 
debt to the U.S., to facilitate its participation in ECOMOG operations in 1991. The U.S. 
also contributed $19.8 million and another $30 million in 1993 to the UN Trust Fund 
used to facilitate the participation of OAU troops from Uganda and Tanzania in 1993. 
From the end of 1991 to October 1993 the U.S. provided only about $2.6 million to other 
ECOMOG contingents to meet their transport, communication, medical and fuel needs.48  
Similarly, the U.S. encouraged Ivorian President Houphouët Boigny to play a lead 
role in mediation efforts designed to overcome the stalemate in the peace process, which 
it believed arose from Taylor’s loss of faith in the Nigerian dominated process.49. This 
resulted in Houphouët Boigny’s lead role in the regional mediation effort from 1991 to 
1993, using the francophone dominated Committee Five.50 This effort evolved through 
Yamoussoukro peace talks (I to IV). Within this period relative stability was experienced 
and Taylor’s political position was significantly strengthened. Taylor took advantage of 
this to exploit and trade in the lootable resources in the territory under his control, thus 
boosting his war economy, enhancing his economic fortune, and strengthening his 
military capacity. However, Côte d’Ivoire’s mediation effort failed with Taylor’s breach 
of the cease-fire and attempt to seize power by force in Operation Octopus of October 
1992. The aftermath of Octopus led to increased involvement of the UN in the conflict in 
1993 and the tilt towards political accommodation of the warlords.  
 
                                                 
48 “U.S. Policy in Liberia”, Hearing before the Sub Committee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, 18 May 1994 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1995), 103.  
49 Note that the SMC, saddled with the mediation efforts was dominated by Nigeria, other anti Taylor 
Anglo phone states and Guinea. Doubt on the neutrality of the SMC especially by Franco member states 
undermined regional consensus and the legitimacy of the peace process. This stalemated the peace process. 
and necessitated  the establishment of the Committee of Five. The committee was aimed at enhancing the 
mediation efforts and improving regional consensus. 
50 The Committee of Five was composed of Gambia, Togo, Senegal, Guinea – Bissau, and Cote d’ I 
voire. It was tasked to work together with the non-governmental mediation group of former U.S. President, 
Jimmy Carter—the International Negotiation Network (INN) in monitoring the cease-fire, mediating 
between the various factions and guaranteeing security in the areas under their control. Clearly dominated 
by Franco phone member states, the committee focused more on diplomacy rather than military approach. 
Its approach which was perceived as favorable to Taylor, represented a major inroad by Franco phone 
member states, notably Cote d’ I voire in the Nigerian-led Anglo phone dominated intervention. Within this 
period, the Committee of Five wrestled the intervention initiative from the Anglo phone dominated SMC. 
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2. Regional Political Dynamics  
 Political rivalry and acrimonious relationships divided the leaders of ECOWAS 
into pro- and anti-Taylor camps from the outset. Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire 
supported Charles Taylor's rebellion against Liberia’s President Doe from its inception. 
Sierra Leone, Guinea, Gambia and Ghana were generally seen to have been mildly anti-
Taylor, largely in response to the escalating effects of the Taylor insurgency on the 
security of their countries. (The NPFL harbored dissidents from Sierra Leone, Guinea and 
Gambia). Nigeria’s perceived hegemonic ambitions and the close ties between Nigerian 
President Babangida and Liberian President Doe marked Nigeria as staunchly anti-
Taylor, and set it on collision course with its francophone rival Côte d'Ivoire, as well as 
with Burkina Faso. The peace enforcement intervention was further hobbled by these 
sub-regional divisions. 
Burkinabé President Compaoré and Ivorian President Houphouët Boigny each 
provided bilateral support to Charles Taylor’s rebellion. Compaoré's and Houphouët-
Boigny's support for Taylor were motivated by personal interests as well as economic and 
strategic considerations. The former is believed to have assisted Taylor’s forces with 
military training and the procurement of arms through Libya, while Côte d’Ivoire 
provided a staging post and route for arms supply and recruitment of Liberian fighters 
from along its border. For Houphouët Boigny, opposition to Doe was personal. Soon after 
the coup that brought him to power in 1980, Doe killed deposed President William 
Tolbert and his son Aldophous, who was married to Houphouët Boigny’s niece. 
Compaoré, on the other hand, had a close personal relationship with Taylor.  Taylor came 
to Ouagadougou, after Compaoré secured his release from a Ghanaian jail, at the time of 
Compaoré's coup in October 1988. Taylor later became President Compaoré’s private 
security officer.51 Burkina Faso remained the main source of arms for the NPFL 
throughout the civil war, and Compaoré admitted in September 1991 that 700 Burkinabé 
soldiers assisted Taylor during the initial stage of the war. He benefited from trade with 
                                                 
51 Klass Van Walraven, “Containing Conflicts in the Economic Community of West African States: 
Lesson from the Intervention in Liberia, 1990-1997,” A Project Conflict Prevention in West Africa Paper, 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations (January 1999), 33. 
 20
Taylor during the war, and hoped for continued strategic influence in a post-war Taylor-
controlled government.52 With such overt support directed at dislodging Doe from power 
and delivering the Liberian state to their client, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire were set 
for collision with an ECOWAS intervention aimed at stopping Taylor’s insurgency. The 
fact that the intervention was led by Nigeria and Guinea, both of which had historically 
strained relations with Côte d 'Ivoire, only made matters worse.53  
Nigeria was the arrow head of the anti-Taylor actors. Prior to the onset of the 
Taylor insurgency Nigeria was a major ally and backer of the Doe regime. However, 
Nigeria’s relations with Doe’s Liberia were initially strained. In 1980 the civilian 
government of Nigeria refused to recognize Doe’s military junta after the violent 
overthrow of the Tolbert government. President Doe was even prevented from attending 
the summit of the Organization of African Unity in Lagos that year. But all that was 
reversed by Military President Babangida, who became the main source of regional 
support for Doe, and allegedly supplied the Doe government with arms before the 
escalation of the conflict.54 Therefore when Nigeria became a peacemaker in the conflict, 
it was naturally difficult for Charles Taylor and his sub-regional backers, who themselves 
had scores to settle with Doe, to see Nigeria as a neutral arbiter. Taylor consistently 
opposed the inclusion of Nigerian troops in the ECOMOG force and accused Nigeria of 
pursuing partisan interests.55  
Sierra Leone, Guinea, Gambia and Ghana who would constitute the body of the 
arrow had reason to be opposed to the Taylor insurgency from the onset. The recruitment 
pattern and composition of Taylor’s NPFL sets it up for the opposition it received from 
theses states. Taylor's fighting force included disaffected youngsters from all over the 
sub-region (especially from neighboring Sierra Leone, Gambia and Guinea) who found 
the NPFL a convenient platform to pursue grievances against regimes in their own 
                                                 
52 Adebayo, Liberia’s Civil War, 55. 
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54 Adekeye Adebayo, “In Search of Warlords: Hegemonic Peacekeeping in Liberia and Somalia,” 
International Peacekeeping 10, 4 (2003):68. 
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countries56 It was therefore not surprising that these states would support the ECOWAS 
intervention against the Taylor insurgency. Van Walraven suggests that Taylor 
demonstrated a kind of adventurism in pursuit of power that indirectly threatened all 
regimes in the sub-region. According to Babangida, "Taylor represents the kind of 
madness we all abhor and condemn.”57 Despite being insulated from the immediate fall 
out from Taylor’s activities, Ghana too harbored anti-Taylor sentiments and encouraged 
an ECOMOG intervention. Taylor’s NPFL forces attacked the Ghanaian Embassy and 
took some Ghanaians hostages on entering Monrovia in 1990. The invasion of Monrovia 
left in its trail a serious humanitarian disaster which Ghana condemned.  Thereafter 
Ghana’s Foreign Minister Obed Asamoah and General Emmanuel Erskine, former 
Ghanaian United Nations Force commander in Lebanon and a respected voice in Ghana, 
both called for ECOWAS intervention against the insurgency on humanitarian grounds 
and to contain the threat to regional stability.58 Additionally, President Rawlings arrived 
in Banjul on 30 May 1990 for the first ECOWAS summit on the Liberian crisis with his 
military planners, including General Arnold Quainoo, who later became the first 
ECOMOG commander.59 This suggests Ghana was also inclined to support military 
intervention against Taylor’s insurgency from the onset. 
3. ECOMOG Intervention and Attempt to Enforce Peace 
a. The Intervention 
Some fear that ECOMOG is an imperial excuse for Nigeria to interfere in 
the internal affairs of smaller states60 
Major General Maxwell Khobe 
 
Former Nigerian ECOMOG Task Force Commander and Chief of Defense 
Staff Sierra Leone Armed Forces 
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At the thirteenth ECOWAS Summit in Banjul, Gambia, on 30 May 1990 Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, Gambia, Guinea and Ghana pushed for an ECOWAS intervention.  A 
Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), composed of Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Mali, and 
Togo, was set up and mandated to seek ways of resolving the Liberian conflict. The SMC 
subsequently adopted the IFMC peace plan and set up ECOMOG. However, and not 
surprisingly, there was not a sub-regional consensus on the decision to intervene. Burkina 
Faso and Côte d'Ivoire were in the forefront of the opposition, and the debate effectively 
balkanized the sub-regional body into Francophone and Anglophone blocs (with Guinea 
crossing over to the Anglophone bloc). The Francophone bloc argued that ECOWAS 
political and military intervention with ECOMOG was a violation of the ECOWAS 
Charter, which forbade interference in the internal affairs of member states.61 Burkina 
Faso refused to recognize ECOMOG, maintaining that the SMC was not competent to 
interfere in a member state’s internal affairs and that the military conflict should be 
resolved by Liberians. The Francophone bloc also complained that the intervention had 
been presented to them as a fait accompli by the Anglophone bloc. As a result of the 
balkanization along language lines, Francophone Mali and Togo, original members of the 
SMC, ultimately declined to contribute troops, apparently after being persuaded by their 
francophone colleagues to back away. Francophone Senegal argued that an intervention 
in the name of ECOWAS should be referred to an extraordinary summit of ECOWAS 
Heads of State and government.62 Nevertheless, Nigeria rallied a coalition made up of 
Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Gambia, contributed the bulk of the troops and 90 
percent of the funding and dispatched the ECOMOG to Liberia in August 1990. The 
deployment of ECOMOG to Liberia was approved three months later at the Bamako 
Summit.  
Three warring parties existed at the time of ECOMOG’s initial intervention: the 
AFL in support of Doe’s government; Taylor's NPFL, and the Independent National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) a breakaway from the NPFL led by Prince Yormie 
Johnson. There was no cease-fire agreement among the warring parties and fighting was 
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ongoing among all three. While the AFL and Prince Johnson welcomed ECOMOG’s 
intervention, Taylor opposed the intervention and threatened to engage ECOMOG 
militarily. He particularly objected to Nigeria’s dominant role in the force because of the 
relationship between Nigeria’s President Babangida and Doe and questioned Nigeria’s 
neutrality. Equally importantly, when ECOMOG deployed, Taylor was in control of over 
90 percent of the country, had encircled the capital Monrovia, and was within a few 
kilometers of the Executive Mansion where an embattled President Doe was holed up. 
The ECOMOG intervention stood between him and victory. He made good his promise 
and attacked the intervening ECOMOG forces with coordinated artillery attack as it tried 
to move into position on the 24 August 1990. 
b. Peace Enforcement 
If a faction decides to take on us [sic] and challenge the peacekeepers, 
then the enforcement role comes in. We must make all factions comply 
with the collective wisdom of others…Then, we will return to our 
peacekeeping posture.63 
General Adetunji Olurin 
ECOMOG field commander, 1992-1993 
 
After the Banjul meeting of 30 May 1990, the SMC convened a national 
conference involving seventeen Liberian political parties, NGOs and other interest groups 
in Liberia to shape the direction of the resolution of the Liberian conflict. This met the 
aspiration of various civilian groups, which had earlier tried unsuccessfully to initiate 
such conference before the intervention of ECOMOG, including the unsuccessful IFMC 
attempt to mediate and broker a deal between Taylor and Doe in June 1990 at 
Freetown.64 After the failed mediation attempt between Taylor and President Doe, Taylor 
shunned subsequent attempts at mediation. Consequently, the subsequent SMC convened 
national conference in Banjul nominated Amos Sawyer as the head of the Interim 
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Government of National Unity (IGNU).65 Taylor responded by establishing his own 
government called the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly (NPRA) with 
headquarters in Gbarnga, northern Liberia in October 1990 and intensified military 
attacks on ECOMOG and Monrovia in an attempt to seize power by force. Consequently, 
Nigeria pushed for enforcement actions to coerce Taylor to comply with the peace plan. 
The enforcement action was opposed by the Francophone bloc in ECOWAS and by the 
UN and U.S., but Nigeria again pressed ECOMOG forward.  
The first attempt at peace enforcement which was codenamed Operation Liberty 
commenced 1 October 1990 and lasted for 3 weeks. It sought to secure Monrovia as a 
safe haven from Taylor’s continued military assault. It was undertaken by Nigeria’s 
General Nimyel Joshua Dongoyaro as a limited offensive operation. In this ECOMOG 
collaborated with the AFL and the INPFL in routing the NPFL from the capital-
Monrovia. The enforcement action was directly challenged by Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina 
Faso, which attempted (unsuccessfully) to halt it by calling for a summit of heads of state 
at Yamoussoukro in mid October 1990.66 The offensive was eventually halted 
prematurely, on the intervention of Malian President Mousa Traore who reportedly 
prevailed on upon Babangida to halt the offensive having secured assurances from Taylor 
that he was prepared to negotiate an end to the conflict and the establishment of an 
interim government at a peace conference scheduled for November in Bamako, a 
proposal to which he had previously objected. The enforcement action realized its 
immediate objective of securing Monrovia as a safe haven and creating a buffer zone 
around the city. It forced Taylor to abandon Monrovia to ECOMOG. ECOMOG also 
captured Spriggs Payne Airport located within Monrovia and the port of Buchanan 
bordering the Atlantic in Southwest of Liberia from the NPFL. This stemmed the flow of 
arms import to the NPFL through these facilities. The enforcement action compelled 
Taylor to acquiesce to cease–fire and the Bamako Peace Agreement of November 1990. 
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It also enabled the relocation of the Amos Sawyer led IGNU from Banjul to Monrovia 
and secured stability that lasted until October 1992.  67  
Evidently, the enforcement action was succeeding and ECOMOG was anxious to 
press on with its initial military success to achieve military victory but for the diplomatic 
intervention that halted it. General Dongoyaro said following the halting of the offensive 
that the “whole thing would have been finished a long time ago, but political 
considerations are naturally superior to military decisions.”68  His request for 2-3 more 
battalions to complete the tasks of establishing a cease-fire across Liberia was denied by 
Babangida, who apparently acquiesced to political pressure from some ECOWAS heads 
of state to halt the offensive.  
Had the enforcement action continued with regional/international support, 
ECOMOG’s initial military success, which saw Taylor’s abandoning Monrovia and 
losing strategic facilities and acquiescing to a cease-fire, would likely have culminated in 
bringing the conflict to an end, which would have eliminated the need for ECOMOG’s 
recourse to patronizing rival factions. Neighboring borders that provided conduit through 
which illicit arms and lootable resources were channeled in and out could have been 
closed (this was key to the UN operations later), and while smuggling of diamonds and 
guns may not have been totally eliminated because of the difficulty neighboring countries 
have controlling their own territories, it certainly would have been reduced.69 This would 
have minimized the economic incentive that drove the conflict.  
 However, in line with the apparent preference for a political solution by other 
regional and key international actors, Houphouët Boigny, with the U.S. support, assumed 
the lead role in the regional mediation effort that followed from 1991 to 1993. But this 
only further complicated the speedy resolution of the conflict as it set the Francophone 
and Anglophone blocs on competing strategic courses. The negotiation efforts 
(Houphouët Boigny’s) led to Yamoussoukro I to IV peace talks. The negotiations 
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undermined and infact reversed the gains of the enforcement action and reinforce 
Taylor’s position. Yamoussoukro 1 of June 1991 called for the IGNU and NPRAG to 
provide security in areas under their control until elections for a post-conflict government 
were held. This minimized the Amos Sawyer led IGNU because it provides legitimacy 
for Taylor’s parallel NPRAG government.70 Taylor was quick to announce that 
Yamoussoukro I did not recognize Sawyer’s IGNU as the only legitimate government in 
the country. This de facto recognition of dual administrations effectively partitioned the 
country into two, with the IGNU controlling Monrovia and the NPRAG controlling the 
rest of the country.71 This gave Taylor, who had been forced to abandoned Monrovia and 
acquiesce to the Bamako Ceasefire Agreement, an opportunity to legitimately exploit the 
lootable resources in areas under his control unhindered and to strengthen his bargaining 
position. 
 The halting and subsequent reversal of the gains of the peace enforcement action 
set the stage for the emergence of new factions.  The United Liberation Movement of 
Liberia (ULIMO) emerged on 29 May 1991 with the aim of “freeing Liberia from 
Taylor’s plunder.”72 ULIMO was widely seen as a creation of ECOMOG to counter the 
renewed NPFL challenge facilitated by Côte d’Ivoire. ECOMOG was no doubt driven to 
the unsavory strategy of propping up ULIMO by the equally unsavory strategies (less 
obviously so) of Houphouët and other Taylor backers. The effects of competition 
between pro- and anti-Taylor actors in the sub-region clearly highlight the extent to 
which success was undermined by the lack of regional/international cooperation in the 
effort to end the Liberian conflict. With such cooperation ECOMOG could have called 
upon peacekeeping troops to impose order rather than being forced to rely upon militias 
to undermine Taylor after other ECOWAS member states had fortified him. The 
unraveling of the peace enforcement gains, and the refusal of ECOMOG to accept the 
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alternative being pursued at Yamassoukro, encouraged Taylor to attempt once again to 
take Monrovia militarily through Operation Octopus. Operation Octopus involved 
simultaneous NPFL attacks on Monrovia and key ECOMOG positions in October 1992. 
ECOMOG responded with a second enforcement action in January 1993.73  
Led by Nigeria’s General Adetunji Olurin, the second enforcement action (which 
ECOMOG regarded as a defensive operation like the first enforcement action) was 
prosecuted in collaboration with anti NPFL factions - the AFL and new entrant ULIMO.  
It involved aerial bombardment of Taylor’s strategic and economic assets, including the 
Roberts International Airport (used by Taylor as an entry point for arms supplies), the 
Firestone Plantation (a key economic asset, which Taylor exploited to boost his war 
economy), the Buchanan Port (used by Taylor as a loading point for illegal exportation of 
iron ore, timber and rubber), and the highway town of Kakata (a key supply route). Once 
again the offensive was halted prematurely by regional and international pressure and 
criticism of ECOMOG’s decision to wage war in league with rival warring parties against 
the NPFL.74 Nevertheless, the incomplete offensive had reduced Taylor’s control of 
Liberian territory from 95 percent to 50 percent, as ULIMO took control of most of 
northwestern Liberia including the strategic Bong mines, and also cut the NPFL off from 
its Revolutionary United Front (RUF) allies in Sierra Leone.75 The loss of territory, 
strategic and economic assets reduced Taylor’s access to arms and profiteering from his 
war economy. With this Taylor’s military and economic position was again significantly 
weakened. No longer in a position of strength, Taylor once again returned to the 
negotiating table.  
In the eyes of many ECOMOG was partisan in the application of the enforcement 
action, and as a result credibility as a neutral party and in fact came to be regarded as a 
warring faction itself. Herman Cohen, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, 
declared that, “ECOWAS had ceased to be a neutral party, and had become one of the 
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combatants.”76 Regionally, opposition came not only from Taylor’s backers, but also 
from Nigeria’s key ally, Ghana. Although the Ghanaians had participated in ECOMOG 
from the beginning and were initially opposed to allowing Taylor to take power through 
violence, like the U.S. they never really supported ECOMOG's targeting of one party to 
the conflict in its peace enforcement actions.  Instead they now favored a negotiated 
solution that would accommodate rather than exclude Taylor, having come to believe that 
the solution to the Liberian crisis could only come from Taylor, the chief protagonist. 
Koffi Totobi Quakye, Ghana’s information Minister, said at the time: “Ghana is anxious 
to find areas of compromise. Compromise lies in the hands of Taylor. There is a Nigerian 
passion to annihilate Taylor. Charles Taylor is aware of [sic] the Ghanaian way of doing 
things is more accommodating and is looking more at the way of achieving the end of 
having an election.”77 The failure to effectively enforce peace in the early stage of the 
intervention led to Ghana’s 1993 conclusion that peace could not be achieved outside a 
political arrangement that embrace Taylor.  
In spite of the opposition and criticisms, like the first enforcement action, the 
second attempt at peace enforcement sufficiently demonstrated that with regional and 
international support, ECOMOG would have been able to implement a military solution 
to the conflict. However, as was the case with the early halting of first enforcement 
action, the situation again tilted back towards mediation efforts, with the introduction of 
the UN and OAU into the mediation process leading to the Cotonou Agreement of July 
25, 1993. Like the Bamako Agreement, it offered the warlords political opportunities 
which undermined ECOMOG’s military gains and encouraged the emergence of new 
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Defense Force (LDF), sprang up in the competition for control of territory, exploitation 
of lootable resources and to gain inclusion in the peace deal. This further complicated the 
resolution of the conflict.78  
The emergence of these new groups triggered renewed fighting amongst factions, 
which led to massive refugee flows into Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, raising concerns about 
potential regional destabilization. Gradually, Houphouët Boigny’s concerns about Côte 
d’Ivoire’s own national security weakened his support for Taylor.79 However, by that 
time it was clear to all that ECOMOG's effort to forcefully implement a peace plan that 
would have marginalized the warlords had failed. 
In retrospect it is clear that peace enforcement presented the “best” course of 
action in the Liberian circumstance. Violence and instability would continue to plague 
Liberia until Taylor was finally forced from power and into exile in 2003.  Taylor had no 
incentive to accept any initial peace plan that offered him no significant political benefit, 
and in this circumstance, such a plan only stood a chance if ECOWAS enforced 
compliance military. Efforts to implement the peace plan on premises other than 
enforcement were clearly doomed, or as Amos Sawyer, Liberia’s first interim 
government chairman, put it, too optimistic.80 However, the successful implementation of 
ECOMOG’s enforcement action depended on international support and regional 
consensus, which was absent. This exacerbated ECOMOG’s situation and constrained her 
to resort to patronage and alliance with anti NPFL forces. The alliance contributed 
significantly to the evident gains of ECOMOG’s peace enforcement actions against the 
NPFL (Taylor’s capitulation and the shrinking of his military and economic 
preponderance and loss of strategic and economic assets which forced him back to the 
negotiating table). The gain of the enforcement actions highlights the critical facilitating 
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factor which regional consensus and international support would have been to 
ECOMOG’s efforts to resolve the conflict in its early stage. 
4. Transition to Appeasement 
Liberia’s cycle of violence has its foundation in the policy of appeasement 
in which the warlords, responsible for many atrocities, assumed political 
power without mechanisms to ensure peace-building.81 
The foundation for the strategic shift from enforcement to appeasement of the 
warlords was laid with the direct involvement of the UN and the OAU in the conflict. 
After his appointment in October 1992 as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General in Liberia, Trevor Gordon-Somers began conferring with West African political 
leaders on a potential UN contribution to the Liberian peace process. The OAU showed 
similar inclination with the appointment of Reverend Canaan Banana as the OAU 
Eminent Person to the Liberian crisis in January 1993. Against this background and with 
the ECOWAS increasingly prepared to abandon its failed peace enforcement strategy, 
Benin President and ECOWAS chairman Nicephore Soglo began working toward a 
larger UN role. Thus under the joint chairmanship of the UN, ECOWAS and the OAU, 
UN-financed and organized peace talks were held in Geneva from 10-17 July 1993. An 
agreement worked out at those talks was signed in Cotonou, Benin on July 25 1993.  The 
Cotonou Agreement marked the genesis of the “power for guns” policy by which 
international negotiators sought to accommodate the armed factions with offers of access 
to significant state power.82 The shift to the UN, marked by the UN/Benin brokered 
accord, came at a time when Nigerian President Babangida was distracted by a domestic 
political crisis that lingered from June to November 1993 and eventually led to his 
removal from power.  This was a critical facilitating factor in the easing of Nigeria's 
previous hard line posture on enforcement and exclusion of the warlords.83 
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The Geneva peace talks accorded the warlords significant influence in the 
formulation and content of the Cotonou Agreement.84 This was a departure from previous 
arrangements where agreements were decided by ECOWAS member states dealing with 
the civil society -led interim government. The Cotonou Agreement proposed a new 
transitional government, to be known as the Liberian National Transitional Government 
(LNTG), composed of a 5 member executive council of state and a 35 member legislature 
in which the rebel factions would be represented alongside the IGNU. Thus, the IGNU 
was reduced from a government to a faction. The council of state was to be made up of 
representatives of the two largest rebel factions (NPFL and ULIMO), the IGNU and 2 
civil society representatives.85 The 35 member legislature would be composed of 
representatives of the IGNU and Taylor’s National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly 
Government (NPRAG), in addition to 9 representatives of ULIMO. The LNTG was to be 
in place by August 1993 with a presidential election following 7 months later. Despite 
giving the warlords a greater role in the LNTG, Cotonou retained the initial peace plan’s 
caveat that the warlords would be ineligible to contest the elections if they took up 
council membership. It was thus not yet an offer of warlord peace.  (Factional leaders 
choose to send representatives to the council so that they would remain eligible to contest 
the elections).  Nevertheless, because Cotonou accorded the warlords, particularly Taylor, 
respite and the legitimacy that came with involvement in the formulation and content of 
the Agreement, they saw it as a welcome development and readily embraced it. Cotonou 
was a major departure from the previous peace plan in that it shielded the warlords from 
prosecution for war crimes and human rights abuses by granting a general amnesty. 
Additionally, it expanded ECOMOG to include troops from non-West African OAU 
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Finally, it introduced the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) with 
368 observers. ECOMOG saw UNOMIL as a watch dog deliberately introduced to 
placate Taylor.86  
ECOWAS' strategic shift to the political accommodation of the warlords thus 
began with the Cotonou Agreement. Although the primary cause of the shift was the 
failure of peace enforcement, which I have argued was due primarily to insufficient 
regional and international support, changes of government in Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire at 
the end of 1993 were significant contributing factors.  Both of the new presidents, Sani 
Abacha in Nigeria and Henri Konan Bédié in Côte d'Ivoire had more serious domestic 
political problems to contend with than had their predecessors and were therefore less 
interested in what one analyst describes as an “uncertain foreign adventure.”87 In 
addition, Abacha faced a dramatically different economic situation from that faced by 
Babangida when he initiated the Liberian intervention. In the early 1990s Nigeria had 
been awash in oil revenues as a result of the Gulf War windfall. By the end of 1993, the 
windfall was over. Abacha had to contend with a crippling pro-democracy oil strike that 
virtually paralyzed the country for 9 weeks between July and September 1994. For the 
better part of his administration he also suffered international isolation and sanctions as a 
result of his coup d'état and subsequent poor human rights record, including most notably 
the hanging of environmental activist Ken Saro Wiwa.88 He was therefore compelled to 
focus on consolidating power at home. Bédié too did not have the personal stake in the 
Liberian conflict as Houphouët had. As a result of all of this, the change in governments 
in Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire provided both countries the opportunity for save facing 
while doing what needed to be done. 
In this context, and frustrated with the lack of progress in the peace talks and the 
heavy financial burden on Nigeria, at the OAU summit at Tunis on 13 June 1994 Abacha 
indicated his intention to withdraw from Liberia barely eights months after taking over 
power. According to the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Nigeria 
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specifically said that it would have to withdraw its contingents unless a solution could be 
found to the problem.”89 By November 1994 Nigeria had reduced its troop strength in 
Liberia from 10,000 to 6,000, and withdrawn all its heavy military equipment. Ghana 
also expressed its frustration with the lack of progress with the peace talks and threatened 
to withdraw its peacekeepers. On February 8 1994 Ghanaian foreign ministry announced 
that Ghana would withdraw 900 peacekeepers from ECOMOG within thirty days if 
progress was not made with the talks. The same threat was repeated by Ghana’s foreign 
minister at the June 1994 OAU summit in Tunis.90 With the failure of peace enforcement, 
continued intractability of the conflict and the escalating refugee influxes into their 
countries (100,000 into Côte d’Ivoire and 60,000 into Guinea between September and 
October 1994), neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone, also began 
supporting the option of political accommodation of the warlords.  
C. CONCLUSION  
 In the absence of credible international response to the onset of the Liberian 
conflict, Nigeria led the push for ECOWAS political and military intervention. But the 
intervention was handicapped from the beginning by regional political division, rivalry 
and lack of consensus. The intervention was further undermined by the peace plan itself 
which was rooted on a faulty premise. It presupposes Taylor would easily acquiesce to 
the plan, the absence of which necessitated recourse to the enforcement.  ECOWAS’ 
attempt to achieve peace through enforcement and political exclusion of the warlords 
diverged with other regional actors and international interests who preferred a political 
solution in which the warlords played significant political roles. Subsequent ECOWAS 
enforcement (pushed largely by Nigeria) which was carried out in alliance with rival 
factional groups against the NPFL was opposed and criticized by others involved in the 
peace process as partisan, in spite of the obvious Taylor’s intransigence which constituted 
a serious impediment to the successful implementation of the peace plan. In the end, 
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ECOWAS attempt to enforce compliance with the peace plan failed, and it gave way to 
the tilt towards the political accommodation and appeasement of the warlords. 
 Peace enforcement was abandoned largely for reasons that had nothing to do with 
an assessment of the “best” approach to resolving the problem in Liberia.  It would have 
accomplished what was minimally required for a lasting peace and a real democratic 
post-conflict government if it had succeeded, and it had a real chance of succeeding if it 
had been given support internationally and regionally. Thus ECOMOG failed in its 
attempt to enforce peace primarily because it failed to exact regional consensus and 
international support, a key requirement in multinational peace effort involving regional 















III. NEGOTIATING WARLORD PEACE 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
With the failure of peace enforcement accepted by all, including Nigeria, strategy 
shifted towards finding a political solution that embraced the warlords. This chapter 
discusses the process by which the warlords were legitimated as political leaders and 
argues that the process led to end state of a warlord peace. It further argues that the focus 
on warlord peace undermined the implementation of the crucial security provisions of the 
agreement, which later became significant in the subsequent flawed implementation of 
Abuja II. It begins by tracing the process by which the warlords were legitimated as 
political leaders and how it culminated in Abuja II. It identifies and explains the flaws in 
the design of Abuja and the failure to implement its security provision before the 
termination of the transitional government.  
B. LEGITIMATING THE WARLORDS (1994 -1996) 
Despite the shift in strategy, peace continued to be elusive, and new armed groups 
formed to compete for control of territory, both for the purpose of extracting economic 
resources and to gain inclusion in the peace deal. The LNTG also proved to be largely 
ineffective, failing to extend its authority beyond Monrovia. This was so largely because 
the factional representatives in the LNTG had little influence over the factions they 
claimed to represent. Additionally, several factional representatives, mostly of the NPFL, 
defected from their factions once they got into the Council, seeking to establish 
themselves as independent power brokers.91 As a result, they lost all influence in the 
field, and the LNTG was therefore unable to persuade the factions to comply with the 
peace plan, especially on the issue of disarmament.92 Whether disarmament should 
precede or follow the installation of a new interim government remained a contentious 
issue among regional actors and the factions. While Nigeria, the IGNU and the weaker 
factions insisted on total disarmament prior to the installation of the new interim 
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government, others, including Taylor insisted that the new interim government 
comprising the factional leaders oversee the disarmament.  It was in this circumstance 
that required the restarting of the mediation process in 1994, this time led by Ghana. 
1. Akosombo and the Appeasement Strategy  
Recognizing that the factions would not disarm because it was not in their interest 
to do so, Ghana maintained that the warlords would have to be lured with a bigger 
political prize to give up their guns. The LNTG would have to be a powerful interim 
administration to make it attractive as a medium through which the warlords could realize 
their political objectives.93 Ghanaian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammed Ibn Chambers 
argued that “in order to achieve effective disarmament one has to engage and deal 
directly with the leaders who own and control the various factions.” He supported the 
idea of direct inclusion of warlords in the Council, while allowing them to remain eligible 
for election, and also the idea of a new interim government preceding disarmament.94 
This contrasted sharply with the Nigeria’s position that a new interim government would 
be more effective if it was preceded by disarmament. That is if the warring parties were 
first convinced to disarm before setting up a new interim government.95 Basically Ghana 
was suggesting that ECOWAS should do whatever is needed to move the peace process 
forward if it was obvious that disarmament before elections could not be achieved.  Thus 
another step was taken toward warlord peace. 
President Rawlings brokered the Akosombo Agreement of September 1994 with 
the leaders of then Liberia’s major factions, Charles Taylor (NPFL), Alhaji Kromah 
(ULIMO-K), and General Hezekiah Bowen (AFL).96 The Akosombo Agreement, 
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witnessed by UNSGSR Trevor Gordon–Somers, provided for the direct inclusion of 
faction leaders in the power-sharing Council of State, without disqualification from 
contesting future elections.  This had been a key demand of the warlords, who wanted to 
be directly represented in the Council and allowed to supervise the disarmament of their 
own factions. Thus, Akosombo laid the foundation of the policy of appeasement. The 
Agreement provided for a new five member Council of State composed of the three 
faction leaders, a representative jointly nominated by Taylor and Kromah, and a fifth 
member to be nominated by the Liberian National Council, a civil society organization.97 
The Council of State would have a rotating chairman and two vice chairmen. Akosombo 
also entrusted the LNTG with responsibilities for implementation of the security 
provisions of the agreement, specifically the responsibility of planning for the 
restructuring and training of the AFL, the Liberian National Police and other security 
forces with assistance from ECOWAS, UNOMIL and friendly countries.98 Additionally, 
the LNTG was also to share joint responsibilities with ECOWAS and UNOMIL to 
conduct disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all warring factions. The 
restructuring and training of the AFL and other security forces constituted the most 
critical and sensitive section of the security provision. It was contained in articles 6, 9 and 
12 of the agreement (Appendix A). Article 6 of the agreement authorizes the LNTG to 
initiate the process of establishing appropriate national security structures, including a 
properly constituted AFL. Article 9 of the agreement specifically emphasizes that the 
AFL should be restructured and the planning for its restructuring and training would be 
the responsibility of the LNTG with assistance from ECOMOG and UNOMIL. It further 
emphasized that the AFL be restructured to reflect the ethnic and geographical balance of 
the country. Article 12 outlined some assisting roles of ECOMOG and UNOMIL and 
warned parties against creating obstacles that would impede the full implementation of 
the security provisions of the agreement.  
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With this, Akosombo handed over the implementation of the peace agreement, 
including the crucial security provisions of restructuring of the armed forces and 
disarming of the factions, to the warlords. A satisfied Taylor exclaimed after the 
agreement that “when the three of us [Taylor, Kromah and AFL leader Bowen] say there 
will be no more war in Liberia, there will be no more war.”99 Liberia’s civil society 
organizations and political class saw Akosombo as an attempt to install a military junta. 
The Liberian National Conference questioned the rationale for replacing the existing 
interim government led by civil society representatives with a government of warlords 
after ECOMOG had struggled for four years to prevent such outcome. Additionally, 
faction leaders that were left out in the Akosombo arrangement, including Roosevelt 
Johnson, George Boley, Tom Woewiyu of the Central Revolutionary Committee of the 
NPFL (CRC-NPFL) and Francois Massaquoi of Loma Defense Force (LDF) also 
opposed Akosombo. Nigeria and ECOWAS Secretary General Edouard Benjamin also 
complained of a lack of consultation. 100 
 Akosombo would be amended with the Accra Clarification of November 1994 to 
include factions that were initially left out, but not to accommodate civil society 
concerns. However, like Akosombo, the Accra Clarification was never implemented as 
hostilities between the warring parties continued unabated. Smaller/weaker parties, 
motivated by fear of domination by the stronger/larger factions, continued to haunt the 
peace process.  With the deadlock unaffected by the latest agreements, the peace train 
moved to Abuja in 1995.  
2. Abuja I & II: Adopting the Appeasement Strategy 
With the failure of Akosombo and Accra, Rawlings ceded the diplomatic lead to 
Nigeria. The first step in the final resolution was facilitating rapprochement between 
Abacha and Taylor. It was generally believed that if common ground could be reached 
between them, the deadlock could be broken and the crisis resolved. The exit of 
Babangida and Houphouët Boigny depersonalized the conflict and removed a critical 
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obstacle to reaching a regional consensus. Abacha calculated that resolution of the 
intractable Liberian crisis would be good for his battered image both domestically and 
internationally. He was therefore predisposed to the overture by Taylor to find common 
ground, especially as it was encouraged by the U.S. and various international 
stakeholders, including Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso.101 Taylor’s first meeting with 
Abacha, in Abuja on June 2 1995, was considered a historic breakthrough. This 
rapprochement was instrumental to Nigeria’s dramatic U-turn toward accommodating 
Taylor.  With Nigeria position altered, opposition to Akosombo/Accra and continuing 
criticism from the civil society within Liberia and the region was insufficient to block 
warlord peace.  The 1995 Abuja I Agreement reaffirmed and adopted the Akosombo and 
Accra agreements, and essentially transformed the Council of State into a Council of 
Warlords. It accorded the warlords full political legitimacy by actualizing their direct 
involvement in the council for the first time in the peace process. It expanded the Council 
to six members, comprising the three most powerful warlords (Taylor, Kromah, and now 
George Boley of the LPC) and three civilians (Tamba Tailor, Oscar Quiah and Professor 
Wilton Sankawulu) representing the civil society and other interest groups. Although the 
warlords could not head the council directly, they could nominate its chairman. 
Accordingly, they nominated Sankawulu. Other faction leaders (including Roosevelt 
Johnson, Hezekiah Bowen, Tom Woewiyu, and Francois Massaquoi) were 
accommodated in the LNTG in ministerial capacities. The agreement also called for 
disarmament and elections by January and August 1996 respectively. By this 
arrangement Abuja I accommodated the warlords that had made Akosombo and Accra 
unworkable. It was quite ironic that the final appeasement strategy would be negotiated in 
Abuja, given Nigeria's long and lonely campaign to avoid precisely this outcome. 
ECOWAS described the arrangement as the “most appropriate arrangement for durable 
peaceful settlement to the Liberian crisis.”102 Nevertheless, it was clear from the outset 
the arrangement was driven by expedience.  As Amos Sawyer, Liberia’s first interim  
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government chairman, later noted: “the assumption that [the] power sharing arrangement 
unmonitored and without credible threats of sanction (enforcement) would hold, proved 
to be too optimistic.”103  
The council of warlord’s arrangement manifested several weaknesses that would 
contribute to the fragility of post-conflict peace and stability. First, it accorded the 
warlords considerable powers and influence over the civilian leadership of Council, 
which they exploited to promote their interests. “Power was carved up between Taylor, 
Boley and Kromah in a tactical alliance that had nothing to do with patriotism, peace or 
democracy.”104 With no army to balance the warlords' militias, the civilians in the 
council were powerless. Secondly, the political empowerment of the warlords 
undermined ECOWAS’ political oversight and minimized ECOMOG’s power to the 
point that the warlords called for the signing of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
that would put ECOMOG under their control.105 The power-sharing arrangement 
allocated government departments to Council members, who appointed their loyalists to 
oversee them. Consequently, sensitive departments such as the Liberian National Police 
came under Taylor’s control, a situation he exploited to pack the police force with his 
former militias. The only threat to the power of the warlords under this arrangement came 
from the warlords themselves, and rivalry among them in advance of the presidential 
elections significantly weakened the Council. All these factors contributed to the April 6 
crisis which threatened to derail the Abuja peace process. 
Charles Taylor and Alhaji Kromah, acting in a rare alliance in their capacities as 
Council members ordered the Rapid Response Unit (RRU) of the national police, 
supported by their own militias, to arrest fellow warlord Roosevelt Johnson on charges of 
murder on April 6, 1996.106 Against all advice from Abuja, Accra, Washington and the 
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OAU, Taylor vowed to bring the full force of the law to bear on Roosevelt Johnson.107 
Predictably, Johnson resisted arrest and whipped up ethnic tensions by suggesting that 
Taylor was making a final attempt to eliminate the Krahn ethnic group from the power 
sharing coalition. George Boley, a fellow Krahn, immediately abandoned the Council of 
State and joined forces with Johnson.108 Fierce fighting between NPFL and ULIMO-K 
militias, on the one hand, and ULIMO-J (Roosevelt Johnson’s faction), the AFL and LPC 
(George Boley’s) militias on the other hand ensued.109  
This factional violence led to the collapse of Abuja I, and threatened to derail the 
peace process once again. However, the crisis was ultimately resolved in one last round 
of talks in Abuja in August 1996 which resulted in the Abuja II Accord. In spite of the 
obvious weakness in the council of warlords’ political arrangement, the ECOWAS 
Ministerial Council of the Committee of Nine on Liberia reaffirmed the Abuja I 
framework, with some modifications (Appendix B). The most significant modification 
was the establishment of a new six-member council to be headed by a new chairperson, 
former Liberian senator Ruth Perry, with all the warlords in the council functioning as 
vice presidents with equal status. The implementation timetable was extended by nine 
months and elections scheduled for 30 May 1997.110 Another major modification was the 
incorporation of a sanctions regime, including prohibition from running for elective 
office and persecution by war crime tribunal for anyone who violated Abuja II, designed 
to prevent any new breech of the agreement (Appendix C). 
3. Restructuring the Security Forces 
From the beginning, these agreements represented the best hope for 
permanent peace and reconciliation. But the accords were never 
comprehensively enforced by ECOMOG due to pressure from ECOWAS 
regional leaders and the international community to have a quick-fix 
solution to the Liberian problem. The accords were implemented in a 
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piece meal fashion on the false and faulty logic that elections would 
eventually lead to peace and reconciliation.111 
Following the April 6 crisis, the ECOWAS Ministerial Committee of Nine on the 
Liberian called for the return to the 1995 Abuja Peace Agreement and requested for the 
“verifiable disarmament by all factions along with the creation of new Armed Forces of 
Liberia on a non-tribal basis with contributions of personnel from all factions.”112 This 
call was restated in the eight meeting of the ministerial committee which held at Abuja 
from 15-17 August 1996 wherein the need to restructure the security forces to restore 
their credibility and create a sense of security amongst the citizenry in post election 
Liberia, was stressed. It stated thus: 
The meeting expressed grave concern that security agencies in Liberia 
have deep factional affiliations and in particular, the police had been 
infected with fighters and unqualified personnel at the highest possible 
level. This state of affair had eroded the confidence and sense of security 
in the citizenry. (Paragraph 54) 
With a view to establishing a credible security apparatus for post–election 
Liberia, the meeting endorsed the proposal to restructure the armed forces, 
police and other security institutions to reflect geographical and ethnical 
balance. (Paragraph 55)113 
This recommendation was adopted by ECOWAS heads of state and government. Despite 
this recognition of the need to de-factionalize, de–ethnicize, and restructure the security 
forces before the elections of July 1997, virtually nothing was accomplished during the 
pre-election period.  This failure set post-election Liberia up for exactly the outcome 
ECOWAS had sought to forestall. What accounted for the failure to implement the 
crucial provision on the restructuring of the security forces? 
First, restructuring the security forces was really not a priority of ECOWAS or the 
international community. With the slide into murderous anarchy in the April 6 crisis, a 
weary ECOWAS adopted the position of the international community, which was to end 
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the conflict by whatever means necessary. Officially, elections were viewed as a 
workable strategy of speedy resolution of the conflict. In practice, they provided an exit 
strategy for Nigeria, ECOWAS, and the international community. One Western diplomat 
noted: “Sani Abacha … wants to get out of Liberia. To do that, he has to find a workable 
end-game strategy, which will have to involve elections.”114 The international 
community saw the restructuring of the AFL a necessary part of the peace process, but it 
was more concerned with elections. Support from the U.S. and European Union to 
ECOWAS and Liberia after the April 6 were basically logistical and technical assistance 
to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to boost its capacity to conduct of the 
elections, and for ECOMOG to facilitate deployment throughout the country to provide 
election security. International support to INGOs and NGOs took the form of 
humanitarian relief for displaced persons and refugees. Liberians, fully aware they were 
being abandoned to the warlords, were in no position to compel the international 
community to do what it did not consider a priority. One Liberian noted: “They are 
paying the money and providing security for us, if we insist on one thing they can only 
fund the other.”115 The revised schedule of implementation addresses elections 
exclusively, with no reference whatsoever to the restructuring of the security forces (See 
Appendix D).116 The 1996 revised schedule was consequent upon the collapse of Abuja I 
and by implication the 1995 Schedule of Implementation. 
The warlords themselves had every interest in postponing the restructuring of the 
security forces until after the elections.  Restructuring was thus not on the agenda of the 
warlord dominated Council. Faction leaders in the Council concentrated their efforts on 
the elections, transforming the factional frameworks into political parties.  The stronger 
among them sought to use their superior military strength to consolidate their positions, 
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while the weaker among them felt the need to maintain their militias as a security 
guarantee, especially after the lessons learnt from the April 6 crisis. 
Insofar as Articles 9 and 12 of the Agreement cede responsibility for initiating the 
restructuring of the security forces to the Council, with ECOWAS and the UN in 
assisting roles, restructuring of the armed forces was dead on arrival. An earlier attempt 
by Sankawulu, chairman of the 1995 Council, to address the issue of the restructuring of 
the security forces was blocked by the warlords who were more interested in using the 
Council to further their presidential aspirations.117 A similar tendency was manifested in 
the 1996 Council. Oscar Quiah one of the three civilian members of the 1996 Council 
noted that serious dialogue on key issues of the peace process was blocked by the three 
warlords.118 With the consolidation of warlord power in the 1996 Council, there was no 
impetus whatsoever towards reform. Although ECOMOG repeatedly raised the issue of 
restructuring with ECOWAS, there is no evidence that ECOWAS prompted the Council, 
or that the Council initiated any restructuring at all.119 It was understood that successful 
implementation of the Agreement depended on the goodwill and cooperation of the 
warlords, and ECOWAS was not prepared to upset the apple cart on the issue of 
restructuring the armed forces.120 It was now determined to bring the conflict to 
resolution even if that resolution was a warlords’ peace. 
B. CONCLUSION 
 Following the abandonment of its military and political strategy which sought to 
enforce peace and alienate the warlords politically while patronizing the civil society, 
ECOWAS attempted to create a compromise solution that balanced warlord and civil 
society powers. In the process it lost leverage over the warlords, and was therefore unable 
to negotiate a compromise settlement that included civil society in any meaningful way. 
The warlords seized the initiative, dominated and secured agreements that were largely in 
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their favor and assumed ownership of the transitional governments. Through the 1995 
Abuja I to 1996 Abuja II Accords, which were ostensibly compromises and appeasement 
to elicit the cooperation and compliance of the warlords in order to move the peace 
process forward, the warlords were placed in the driver’s seat in the implementation of 
the peace agreement and they drove straight to warlord peace. Although Abuja II was 
largely an adoption of the 1995 Accord, whose failure portrayed its flawed nature, it 
might still have led to a lasting peace had its security provisions been fully implemented. 
Regrettably, it was not simply because regional and international actors wanted to get out 
and the July 1997 special election which was seen as a convenient exit strategy. The 
failure to restructure the security forces provided the incentive structure for the eventual 
flawed implementation and the partisan application of the security forces by the Taylor 


























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 47
IV. THE FLAWED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY 
PROVISIONS OF THE ABUJA AGREEMENT AND THE 
RESUMPTION OF WAR IN 1999 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II showed that ECOWAS’ 1990-1993 peace enforcement strategy was 
undermined by an absence of international support and regional consensus.  Chapter III 
showed that ECOWAS’ 1994-1996 strategy of compromise with the warlords faltered 
because ECOWAS now had no leverage over the warlords, and was therefore unable to 
negotiate a compromise settlement that included civil society in any meaningful way.  
Having finally accepted warlords peace, largely as an exit strategy, ECOWAS produced 
the Abuja II Accord, a seriously flawed peace agreement, but one which might still have 
led to a lasting, if unjust, peace had it been fully implemented.  This chapter will show 
that the failure to implement the crucial security provision of the agreement as stipulated 
virtually guaranteed a speedy return to war.  The chapter is divided into two parts. The 
first part discusses Taylor’s electoral victory and failure to implement the security 
provisions of the Abuja Agreement after the 1997 elections, and the premature exit of 
ECOMOG from Liberia. The second part traces the process by which the flawed 
“restructuring” of the security forces contributed to the resumption of war in 1999. 
B.  TAYLOR’S ELECTORAL VICTORY, RENEGING ON ABUJA AND THE 
EXIT OF ECOMOG  
1. Taylor’s Electoral Victory 
 Charles Taylor won the July 19, 1997 special elections which marked the end of 
Liberia’s six -year war in a landslide with 75 percent of the vote of the total votes cast. 
His closest opponent, current Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, secured 10 
percent of the vote.121 Although the opposition contested Taylor’s electoral victory, 
international observers, UNOMIL and ECOWAS certified the credibility of the 
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election.122 However, the imbalance that existed in Liberia’s political, resource and 
military topography (created by six years of war) prior to the election clearly favored 
Taylor, suggesting that the election was conducted on an unlevel playing field.  
Indications that the election would be favorable to Taylor were evident from the 
beginning. While other political parties and civic organizations pressed for delay in the 
elections from the initial scheduled date of 30 May 1997 as a result of the extremely tight 
time and resource constraints they faced, Taylor and ECOMOG (which was determined 
to get out of Liberia immediately after the election) continued to call for adherence to the 
30 May 1997 scheduled date. Eventually ECOWAS agreed to delay until 19 July 1997 (a 
mere two months delay). Prior to the election Taylor had far greater resources and better 
organization than other competitors, particularly Johnson Sirleaf, who had only just 
returned from exile. Furthermore, the decision to allow factional leaders to transform 
their factions into political parties, and failure to get Taylor to give up resources he 
illegally acquired during the war, clearly favored Taylor relative to other contestants. 
Consequently, the NPFL, which Taylor quickly converted into a political party-National 
Patriotic Party (NPP), transformed into an effective mass mobilizing political party which 
provided a ready-made structure. The booty from his war economy was also handy in the 
boosting of his electoral kismet. With the material benefits from his illegally acquired 
wealth he was able engage extensively in political patronage and extensive campaigns.123  
Another important factor in Taylor’s electoral victory was fear. The issue of peace 
was central in the election. During campaigns Taylor’s opponents pointed to his violent 
past but could not propose viable actions to contain him in the event that he lost and 
refused to accept defeat. With disarmament and demobilization incomplete, ECOWAS’ 
apparent failure to muster the political and military consensus necessary to effectively 
contain Taylor, and the reiteration of its intention to leave quickly after the election, 
voters were left with no alternative than to vote for Taylor in order to maximize the 
chances of peace and stability. Statements like “Taylor killed my Pa, He killed my Ma, 
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but I will vote for him,”124 attributed to Liberians during the election, showed how the 
fear of a Taylor defeat shaped voters views of the election and the choices available to 
them. 
From this one can only conclude that the election institutionalized the pre-election 
imbalance, placing Liberia on the quick sands of the return to war. In the end Taylor’s 
rise to power was ratified, not by war or a power-sharing arrangement, but by an 
internationally, regionally, and locally accepted the process of election. Thus, warlord 
peace was fully legitimized, suggesting that the use of election on the quick as a workable 
end game strategy was a recipe for disaster.   
2. Reneging on Abuja and Exit of ECOMOG 
Once the founding election is held and third party withdraws its troops, a 
new situation prevails. At that point, the rules and institutions previously 
insisted upon by the weaker parties in an effort to reduce minority 
uncertainty about their future role in the country’s political life may no 
longer be binding.  
Donald Rothchild125 
Even before he was inaugurated on August 2 1997, Taylor indicated that he would 
not live up to the commitment he had made in the Abuja Agreement by declaring that 
ECOMOG would leave Liberia six months (February 2 1998) after the inauguration of 
his government.126 In November 1997, anxious to establish his presidential authority, he 
formally reneged on Abuja's provisions on the restructuring of the security forces, 
declaring that it was his constitutional responsibility to restructure the AFL and no longer 
was the responsibility of ECOMOG, adding that Liberia would not allow foreign troops 
to train its army.127 While Taylor’s actions were clearly inconsistent with the provisions 
of Abuja, his claim to constitutional authority can hardly be disputed, especially since 
there was nothing in Abuja to indicate that the commitment was designed to be binding 
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on the post-war government. This highlights Rothchild’s postulation quoted at the 
beginning of this section and reiterates the need for effective third party implementation 
of sensitive provisions of agreement. 
General Malu acceded to Taylor’s renunciation of Abuja, stating that ECOMOG 
was prepared to leave as soon as the Liberian government convinced ECOWAS that it 
was able to assume full responsibility for its security.128 Although Taylor later altered his 
position on ECOMOG’s quick exit from Liberia, he insisted on a review of ECOMOG 
role, maintaining that ECOMOG's mission must change by February 2, 1998. He 
requested the redeployment General Malu from Liberia and the downsizing of ECOMOG 
to a capacity building force that would work with the Liberian government in the 
maintenance of security. But the suggestion that the force would be under the authority of 
the Liberian Ministry of National Defense, with himself as the commander-in-chief, was 
not acceptable to ECOWAS. Clearly, no country would be willing to contribute troops 
under such conditions. General Malu was replaced in January 1998, and by February 
1998 all national contingents had left Liberia, except Nigeria and Ghana, which retained 
only skeletal troop levels. This downsizing at the behest of President Taylor put paid to 
issue of the restructuring of the security forces by ECOMOG. 
Prior to the July 1997 elections ECOMOG was deployed all over the country with 
a troop strength of about 10,500, and functioned as the key military force responsible for 
the provision and maintenance of security for the state, the government, opposition 
forces, and the population at large. Taylor’s rejection of the security provisions of the 
Abuja Agreement, and call for the early withdrawal of ECOMOG forces thus raised 
security concerns locally and internationally. These concerns were compounded by the 
prospect that ECOMOG would be replaced by ex-rebels. Civic leaders and the diplomatic 
community viewed ECOMOG departure as premature, arguing that it portended danger 
given the fragile security environment in the country. U.S. President Bill Clinton called 
for the maintenance of a peacekeeping force as a guarantee for stability, noting that 
ECOMOG departure would create a dangerous security vacuum that would affect 
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regional stability.129 The Catholic Archbishop of Monrovia, Michael Francis, expressed 
similar fears about the security implications of the exit of ECOMOG, telling the Liberian 
Senate that “the majority of the people of Liberian do not have trust or have confidence in 
the present security forces. They have implicit confidence in ECOMOG.”130 
The sense of insecurity that Taylor’s action elicited was intense given the 
continuing mistrust among the former warring parties, which was itself attributable in 
large part to the hasty implementation of the Abuja Agreement in the transition period. 
Feeling that the election was conducted prematurely, in an atmosphere of inadequate 
security and on an unleveled playing field that favored Taylor, opposition leaders (and 
former military adversaries) Alhaji Kromah and George Boley rejected Taylor’s electoral 
victory and accused the electoral commission and ECOMOG of perpetuating fraud.131 
Already the warlords' peace was beginning to unravel, and an apolitical security force 
was desperately needed. Tensions were increasing among the warlords, and the 
UN/ECOWAS conducted disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of combatants 
program remained incomplete.132 The LNP, dominated by former NPFL militia, was 
becoming the dominant local security force, increasing fears among the other warlords 
that Taylor intended to use the LNP to maintain his post-war advantage over them. 
In this context, civil society groups and Taylor’s archrival Roosevelt Johnson 
protested the decision to renege on the Abuja Agreement and called on ECOWAS to 
stand firm.133 Johnson, former leader of ULIMO-J and then Minister of Rural 
Development in the Taylor government, insisted that the restructuring of the army and 
other security forces be implemented fully according to the Abuja Peace Accord, 
anticipating the return to conflict that would follow from failure to do so. “Under the 
Abuja Accord, the ECOWAS intervention force, ECOMOG, is to restructure the new 
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army. But Taylor said it is his constitutional right to decide who restructures the army. 
We see what is happening, but we try to exercise restraint and remain silent for the better 
and good [sic] of our people.”134 Alhaji Kromah, leader ULIMO-K faction, also warned 
that Taylor’s reneging on the restructuring of the security forces by a neutral body 
portended trouble, and promptly went into self-imposed exile. On December 9 1997 
Taylor appointed him chairman of the National Committee on Reconciliation, but he 
refused to return to the country to take up the appointment, citing fears for his safety. 
This is clear evidence of the escalation of fears of vulnerability that Taylor’s reneging on 
the Abuja Agreement elicited.135 
C.  THE FLAWED RESTRUCTURING OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND 
THE RESUMPTION OF WAR 
The downfall of Taylor’s government was his failure to restructure the 
security forces. 
Daniel Chea, Taylor’s defense minister136 
 Edwin Snowe, Charles Taylor’s son in law and former NPFL stalwart now a 
Senator of the Republic of Liberia, attributed Taylor’s proliferation of multiple para-
military structures and the marginalization of the AFL to accommodate the Anti Terrorist 
Unit (ATU) as the critical factors motivating the insurgency that eventually led to the fall 
of the Taylor government.137 This is consistent with the justification advanced by the 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) insurgency that triggered 
Liberia’s second civil war in 1999. LURD ascribed the rebellion against the Taylor 
government  to Taylor’s failure to allow the international community to restructure the 
AFL, the partisan “restructuring” of the AFL and despotic manner in which Taylor used 
the police and newly created security forces composed of his former NPFL militias to run 
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others out.138 General Victor Malu’s lamentation after Liberia’s return to war also lends 
credence to the role of Taylor’s flawed implementation of the restructuring of Liberia’s 
security forces to the return to war in 1999. General Malu posited that the restructuring of 
the security forces as stipulated in the agreement would have led to post-war stability 
because it would have enhanced the credibility of not only the armed forces but also of 
the government itself. “Prior to the elections, we had eight factions and they were 
transformed into political parties. The idea was to form an army acceptable to all the 
people and not just a section, a clan, or tribe. This is necessary to ensure confidence in the 
elected government.”139 
 Soon after his inauguration Taylor began his own “restructuring” of the AFL. In 
November 1997, he announced the formation of a 1,000 man force, which would form 
the nucleus of a “new” AFL.  Most of these were drawn from his militias.140 He 
maintained that Liberia’s national security and economic realities did not warrant the 
maintenance of then existing 15,000 strong AFL.141 In January 1998 he issued a special 
presidential order to demobilize and retire 2250 AFL personnel on the grounds of old 
age, and went ahead to constitute a 27 member AFL Presidential Restructuring 
Commission to complete the process.142 This move generated tension amongst the Krahn 
and Mandingos, who were disproportionately affected by the demobilization.143  
 Faced with dilemma of the practical political impossibility of eliminating the 
Krahn and Mandingos from the army, and retaining an army whose loyalty was 
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questionable at best, Taylor resorted to the gradual demobilization and marginalization of 
the AFL itself. He limited the role of the AFL in the provision of national security and set 
up parallel security outfits tasked with overlapping functions in the coordination of 
national security. These multiple security outfits were all personally loyal to him.144 The 
new forces were drawn largely from his wartime militia made up of former rebels and 
mercenaries from various West African states. They included the Strike Force, ATU, 
Special Security Unit, Alert Force Republican Guard, Counter Force and the Special 
Operation Division (commanded by his son).145 By 2001, with about 4000 personnel 
demobilized and the AFL reduced to a marginal role in the security of the state (the 
central role having been gradually taken over by the elite ATU since 1998), the AFL had 
almost ceased to exist.146 A high ranking ministry of defense official lamented that this 
situation was the fulfillment of Taylor’s grand design to “keep the AFL weak, under-
funded and on the periphery of national security.”147   
Taylor’s “restructuring” of the security forces sought to accomplish precisely 
what Abuja had sought to prevent, but it was a pragmatic response to the prevailing 
security threat that confronted him at the time.  On assumption of office Taylor was 
confronted with a Krahn dominated “national army” (AFL) that remained opposed to his 
leadership and strongly linked to his arch rivals, former Krahn warlords Roosevelt 
Johnson (ULIMO-J) and George Boley (LPC). In late 1995 eight of the 11 leadership 
positions in the AFL were held by ethnic Krahns.148 Having inherited the army that had 
opposed him throughout the war, Taylor acted to eliminate the AFL threat and to 
consolidate his hold on to power. In the process, he quickly confirmed the fears of 
vulnerabilities expressed by former adversaries and political opponents. The abduction 
and eventual killing of opposition politician and former Taylor loyalist Samuel Dokie and 
members of his family on December 1, 1997, allegedly on the orders of Taylor’s chief 
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bodyguard, confirmed fears of Taylor’s intention to use the security forces against former 
adversaries. Five members of the state security service arrested in connection with the 
murder were released for lack of evidence.149 With the targeting of political opponents 
and growing insecurity, prominent opposition leaders continue to move out of the 
country. Defeated presidential candidates including former warlord George Boley and 
opposition politician Ellen Johnson Sirleaf took refuge in the U.S. Tension flared 
between Roosevelt Johnson and Taylor’s security forces in December 1997 and again in 
August and September 1998. Johnson finally took refuge in the U.S. embassy and was 
evacuated from the country, eventually taking up exile in Nigeria. On November 12 1998 
Taylor accused 32 people, including exile opposition leaders Alhaji Kromah, Roosevelt 
Johnson, George Boley and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, of treason. After a trial in Monrovia, 
most were convicted, some in absentia.150 Had the restructuring been accomplished in the 
transition period in accordance with the provisions of the Abuja Accord, ethnic balance 
would have been achieved, the army depoliticized, and the impetus for Taylor’s 
interventions reduced.   
 The exodus of opposition politicians and Taylor adversaries from Liberia, which 
commenced with Taylor’s rejection of Abuja and the exit of ECOMOG, grew as Taylor 
employed security forces to eliminate rivals. The exodus reached its peak with the 
January 1998 attempt to retire and demobilize mostly Krahn and Mandingo AFL 
personnel.  A significant number of those seeking refuge in Guinea, Sierra Leone and 
Côte d’Ivoire were ex-AFL and LNP personnel. Krahn and Mandingoes withdrew en 
masse from Liberia’s political and military structures, claiming harassment, betrayal and 
assassination at the hands of Taylor’s security forces. The death under mysterious  
 
 
                                                 
149 Sam Dokie was a co-founder of the NPFL. He broke ranks with Taylor during the civil war to form 
the NPFL-CRC with Tom Woewiyu. He remained a prominent post-war political opponent of the Taylor 
government. He and his abducted family were last seen in the custody of the SSS. In spite of the fact that 
Benjamin Yeaten, Taylor‘s chief bodyguard and SSS boss admitted involvement, Taylor exonerated the 
state from the murder.  
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circumstances of former ULIMO-J Brig-Gen Mana Zeki greatly exacerbated the feelingof 
insecurity and further encouraged emigration to the safety of neighboring states, 
particularly Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire.151  
 In April and August 1999, Liberian dissidents, who called themselves Liberians 
United for the Restoration of Democracy (LURD), invaded Voinjama and Kolahun, in 
Lofa County of northern Liberia. In early 2003, a second faction in Côte d’Ivoire 
emerged as the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), opening another front in 
the insurgency against Taylor from the south eastern part of the country (Appendix E). 
The 1999 invasion began Liberia’s second civil war. LURD consisted of mainly 
Mandingo and Krahn ex-service personnel of the AFL and LNP who claimed they were 
wrongfully removed from service and replaced with Taylor’s militias.152 MODEL, whose 
fighters were also composed mainly of former AFL and LNP personnel, articulated 
similar grievances.153  
D. CONCLUSION 
 The effective implementation of a peace agreement, particularly of elements that 
addresses the security concerns of parties to a conflict was critical to the sustainability of 
post-war peace. As anticipated in the theoretical literature, the mistrust and fears of 
vulnerabilities that characterize negotiated settlements, left unaddressed during the 
transition period of a peace process, undermined post-conflict stability in Liberia. 
ECOWAS and the international community in their bid to end Liberia’s war acceded to 
warlord peace at the cost of the failed implementation of the very critical and sensitive 
provision of the restructuring of Liberia’s security forces that might have stabilized that 
peace. By this the transition process of Abuja II created the incentive structure that 
Taylor simply responded to. The provision to de–ethnicize and de-factionalize Liberia’s 
security forces before the elections of July 1997 was designed to forestall exactly this 
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outcome. Warlord peace, which Abuja anticipated would achieve a peaceful resolution of 
Liberia’s intractable civil war, was in the end was no more successful than peace 

























































V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Sustainable post-conflict stability, peace and security remain the foundation on 
which post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction rest. Motivated by the phenomenal 
rise in the instability of negotiated settlements in the 1990s, this thesis set out to answer 
the general question of what determines the sustainability of post-war peace. It found a 
consensus in the theoretical literature that effective and comprehensive implementation of 
peace agreements, particularly of elements that address the security concerns of parties to 
the conflict, is critical to the sustainability of post-war peace. Nevertheless, this 
consensus had not been tested in the case literature on Liberia, and so I sought to 
determine whether the nature of the peace agreements and their implementation were 
critical factors in the failure of the negotiated settlement in Liberia in 1996.  The evidence 
shows that they were.   
Security guarantees were particularly important in Liberia given the country’s 
peculiar political antecedents. The history of Liberia’s political development shows a 
pattern of partisan composition and application of the security forces by successive 
governments as instrument for the perpetuation of state-driven violence and promotion of 
individual, group and ethnic interests. As observed by an analyst “Liberia’s security 
forces have historically served as an instrument of partisan rule, first, defending the 
interests of the Americo-Liberian oligarchy, and then keeping the autocratic regime of 
Doe in power.”154 The requirement for the restructuring of Liberia’s security forces to 
reflect ethnic and geographical balance before the emergence of the post–election 
government of 1997 was aimed at addressing the security concerns of parties to the 
conflict.  This was recognized to be especially important in light of the critical influence 
of the issue of security in the body polity of Liberia in general and the mutual suspicion 
and rivalry that characterized the transition process from 1990 to 1996. The reluctance of 
the warlords to disarm their militias due to ongoing security concerns and the subsequent 
failure of Abuja following the outbreak of April 6 crises clearly lends credence to costs of 
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not having a restructured professional security force in place. Regrettably, at the 
termination of the transition process with the special elections of July 1997 in which 
Charles Taylor emerged victorious, the security forces had not been restructured as 
envisaged in Abuja.  Post-election Liberia was thus set up for exactly the outcome 
ECOWAS initially sought to forestall. In the end the misuse of the security forces which 
triggered the civil war that brought Taylor to power ultimately led to the civil war that 
eventually removed him from power and plunged Liberia into yet another round of 
bloodletting and political instability. 
 This thesis demonstrated that a causal relationship exist between the failure to 
implement the security provisions of the 1996 Abuja II Accord and Liberia’s return to 
war in 1999. It showed that the failure of 1996 LNTG, ECOWAS and the international 
community to ensure the implementation of the security provisions of Abuja created the 
incentive structure for the flawed implementation by the post-war Taylor government 
which became the primary cause of Liberia’s return to war in 1999. Liberia’s return to 
war in 1999 has important implications not only for the current security stabilization and 
reform efforts in Liberia, but also to the understanding of the role of agreement 
implementation in the stability of negotiated settlements elsewhere. 
A.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT SITUATION 
The restructured force shall take into account the country's national 
balance. It shall be composed without any political bias to ensure that it 
represents the national character of Liberia.155 
  While the failure of Abuja showed that regional consensus and international 
support are critical to the successful implementation of a peace agreement where the third 
party implementing agent is a regional organization/regional lead nation and not the United 
Nations or a major world power, the return of Liberia to war in 1999 clearly indicates that 
the effective implementation of a peace agreement, particularly of elements that address 
the security concerns of parties to a conflict is critical to the sustainability of post-war 
peace. It also showed that effective third party leverage and equilibration of power and 
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vulnerability among contending parties to a conflict and civil society actors are critical in 
the negotiation and implementation of a peace agreement. Finally, it highlights the need for 
the consolidation of peace beyond conflict termination tied to elections.  
  Although, presently Liberia has successfully transited to a post-war 
democratically elected government, the consolidation of peace through stability and 
reconstruction efforts is still ongoing. Ostensibly, the international community did not take 
for granted the critical lessons derived from the failure of Abuja and Liberia’s return to war 
in 1999 in its implementation of the 2003 Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
with the Byrant Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG) of 2003-2005. From 
the beginning the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL), the initiators and 
facilitators of the peace talks that ended the war engaged in extensive consultations with 
key local, regional and international actors. This resulted in the peaceful resignation of 
President Taylor and formulation of the CPA which signaled the end of Liberia’s second 
civil war in 2003. It also laid the foundation that facilitated the overwhelming regional 
consensus and international support that greeted the U.S. supported Nigerian led ECOMIL 
vanguard force.156  
 Leverage was also secured for civil society actors both in the formulation and 
implementation of CPA. Thus Chairman Byrant, with the support from the regional and 
international community wielded executive powers throughout the transitional 
government period. No warlord was given the opportunity to wield any significant power 
to compromise the power and vulnerability balance.  
 The recognition that the restructuring of the security forces of Liberia was vital to 
the stability of post-conflict Liberia was evident in the CPA and calls by Liberians that 
the implementation of the security provision to be accorded priority. The security 
provisions of the CPA states that in restructuring the AFL national balance should be 
taken into consideration to ensure that the AFL new command structure be composed to 
reflect the national character of Liberia without any political bias. It also requested that 
ECOWAS, the UN, AU, and the ICGL provide advisory staff, equipment, logistics and 
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experienced trainers for the security reform effort. It specifically requested that the 
United States of America plays a lead role in organizing this restructuring program.157 
 Apparently to forestall the incentive structure pitfall that Abuja fell into, 
Chairman Byrant consistently called on the U.S. and international community to meet the 
commitments on the restructuring of the security forces before the termination of the 
transitional government.  Others also made similar calls. Lawrence G. Gowan, a Liberian 
analyst, warned on the need for effective implementation of the commitment on the 
restructuring of the security forces before the transition to post-war governance. He 
warned that it was likely that after the 2005 elections the CPA would cease to have legal 
value in Liberia, placing the elected government under no obligation to obey it, since 
successive Liberian governments have hardly demonstrated the political will to be 
impartial in the composition of post-war security forces. He wondered why the issue of 
the restructuring of the security forces was considered secondary to the 2005 election in 
the implementation of Accra after what Taylor did to ECOMOG and Abuja after his 
inauguration as an elected president in 1997. Similarly, Major General Joe Wylie, former 
LURD senior military adviser and later Liberia’s Deputy Defense Minister in Bryant’s 
government of 2003-5 warned that the administration of the post-Byrant LNTG stands 
endangered if the LNTG and international community did not ensure that the AFL as 
envisioned in the 2003 Accra CPA, was restructured to a professional army which would 
serve the interest of the Liberia people rather than the interest of a few individuals in 
power as was the case with Abuja.158 
 Although the restructuring of Liberia security forces was not completed before the 
2005 election and inauguration of the current Johnson Sirleaf government, the current 
collaboration between the Sirleaf government, the U.S., and Nigerian governments as 
well as the UN in the ongoing restructuring and security sector reforms efforts in Liberia 
indicate that the implications of Liberia return to war in 1999 was not lost to the 
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international community, particularly the need for consolidation of peace beyond conflict 
termination tied to elections (election as an exit strategy).159  
 So far Liberia has enjoyed three years of post-election stability and there are no 
indications that post-war stability of Liberia would not be enduring. This is informed by 
the manifestations on the ground which shows that the international community is at last 
heeding to the calls for the departure from the futility of warlord peace and elections as 
an exit strategy and embracing the wisdom of effective third party implementation and 
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APPENDIX A: SECURITY PROVISIONS OF THE AKOSOMBO 
AGREEMENT SEPTEMBER 1994 
SECTION E 
Article 6: 
“The parties further mandate the LNTG to begin the formation of 
appropriate national security structures to facilitate the disarmament process. 
Accordingly, appropriate measures shall be undertaken to enable AFL to assume its 
character as a national army. Until such measures are completed the AFL like all 
other parties and warring groups shall be completely disarmed in accordance with 




“Internal security arrangements, including police, customs and immigration, 
will be put in place immediately. Planning for restructuring and training of the AFL 
will be the responsibility of the Liberian National Transitional Government, with 




“The attached schedule of implementation to be attached to this agreement 
including disarmament, encampment and demobilization of combatants, 
preparation of the status of forces agreement, restructuring of the AFL and 
dissolution of the parties drawn up by ECOMOG  and UNOMIL in collaboration 
with parties, shall be given to each parties prior to implementation. The parties 
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APPENDIX B: REAFFIRMATION OF THE 1995 ABUJA 
AGREEMENT160 
Paragraph 28   
The Abuja Agreement (1995) was designed to usher in peace and  
lead to the holding of free and fair elections on 20 August 1995.  
After reviewing developments in Liberia since the signing of the  
agreement, the meeting agreed that no progress has been made  
towards achieving that objective.(emphasis mine) 
 
Paragraph 29 
It was re-affirmed that the Abuja Agreement remained the best and 
last framework for finding durable peace in Liberia and should 
thus be retained in its entirety. Consequently, it was suggested that 
the validity of the Abuja Agreement be extended for another nine 
months from 20 August 1996 to 15 June 1997. However, elections 
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APPENDIX C: MEASURES TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE  ABUJA PEACE PLAN 
• code of conduct for the COS that gave ECOWAS the power to 
replace erring members; 
• freezing of business activities and assets of leading factions leaders in 
ECOWAS states; 
• travel and residence restrictions; 
• exclusion from participation in the electoral process; 
• expulsion of members of families of the erring leader and their 
associates from Member State; 
• restrictions on the use of ECOWAS airspace and territorial waters; 
•  a request to the UN Security Council to impose visa restrictions; and 
• Finally, invoking the OAU summit resolution, which calls for the 
establishment of a war crimes tribunal to adjudge all human rights 
offences161 
                                                 




























APPENDIX D: REVISED SCHEDULE OF IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE ABUJA AGREEMENT FROM CEASE-FIRE TO 
ELECTION AUGUST 1996—MAY 1997162 
(Special Edition) 1997  Official Journal of ECOWAS   Vol 22 
REVISED SCHEDULE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF  
THE ABUJA AGREEMENT FROM CEASE_FIRE TO ELECTION 
AUGUST 1996-MAY1997 
20th to 31st of  August, 1996 A 
Cease-fire, disengagement of factions from 
checkpoints and present combat positions 
1st September to 30 November, 1996 Delivery of logistics supplies by 
international/donors to ECOMOG 
20th August 1996 to 31st January 1997 Verification of ceasefire, and 
disengagement by ECOMOG, UNOMIL 
and LNTG 
3rd to 10th October 1996 Assessment meeting in Liberia by 
chairman’s special envoy with ECOMOG, 
UNOMIL, representatives of donor 
community and LNTG 
12th October 1996 to 31st January 1997 B 
Recce Mission by ECOMOG and 
UNOMIL of arms collection centers 
4th to 8th November 1996 C 
Committee of Nine (Ministerial) Meeting 
in Monrovia 
7th November, 1996, to 31st January 1997 Deployment of ECOMOG to Agreed Safe 
Haven by Committee of Nine 
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22nd November 1996 to 31st January 1997 Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Repatriation 
6th-13th January 1997 Verification visit to Liberia by chairman’s 
special envoy with ECOMOG, UNOMIL, 
Representatives of Donor Community and 
LNTG 
20th January-15 April 1997 D 
Preparations for Elections  
10th to 15th March 1997 Committee of Nine Meeting in Monrovia  
17th  to 24th April 1997 Assessment visit to Liberia by chairman’s 
special envoy with ECOMOG, UNOMIL, 
Representatives of donor community 
30th May 1997 E 
Election day 
Note 
(1) Dissolution of all factions  -  31 January 1997 
(2) Registration of Council members  -   28 February 1997 
 and other office holders wishing 
  to run for elective offices 
(3) Election Day           -  30 May 1997 
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